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This study advocates for the importance of safety for organisations in high risk 
industries and the financial and person related impact that a lack of safety and in 
particular safety behaviour can have on organisations and the employees in those 
organisations. This highlights the need to explore the factors that influence safety 
behaviour of employees within high risk industries, specifically the construction 
industry in South Africa. The research objective of this study is therefore to determine 
why there is variance in safety behaviour amongst employees in the construction 
industry in South Africa and to propose a safety behaviour structural model that 
attempts to explain this variance. To construct this safety behaviour structural model 
literature is consulted to identify, define, and analyse the factors that influence safety 
behaviour, and the relationships between these factors are hypothesized. As a result 
a safety behaviour structural model is proposed. 
The resultant structural model proved to be very comprehensive and a number of 
obstacles arose that prevents first generation testing of the complete model. Due to 
research constraints the safety behaviour model is abridged to allow for empirical 
testing. To test the proposed hypotheses and structural model an ex post facto 
correlation design with Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is used. A sample of 217 
construction workers from various construction sites in the Cape Winelands area 
participated in the study. The results of empirical testing are unpacked, following this 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Organisations primarily exist to serve society. They do this through providing products 
and services to a market, jobs to those that are involved in the production of those 
goods and services, and a business interest to shareholders and owners of the 
organisation. In order for this to occur in a sustainable manner it needs to be done 
profitably, thus there is a need for the effective and efficient use of resources that 
organisations have access to. In essence, these resources are the people and 
machines or equipment that the organisation employs; and profitability is in part a 
function of having the right amount and quality of resources (both human and 
machines), and a good interaction or fit between them (Theron, 2015). 
People bring knowledge, skills, and abilities to the fore and in turn need motivation to 
turn their knowledge, skills, and abilities into productive economic output. A poor 
alignment between humans and machines bring about unnecessary risk which could, 
among other issues, lead to poor safety outcomes which threatens the efficient and 
effective use of both of these resources, as well as financial resources which has a 
serious implication for the profitability of an organisation and therefore its sustainability 
(Theron, 2015). The costs of poor safety outcomes are both monetary and social. 
Some of the monetary costs involved in accidents include labour lawsuits, sick leave, 
loss of key personnel, training of new personnel, compensation costs, but to name a 
few.  
There are several opinions in terms of what explains these undesirable safety 
outcomes in the workplace. Some have argued for person related theories (Brown, 
1984; Feldman, 1981) others emphasised system reasons (Deming, 1986, Bell, 
Wicklund, Manko, & Larkin, 1976) and still others, more understandably so, have 
advocated for and possible solutions to be found in the system-person sequence 
theories. The person theory posits that nearly every accident in the workplace can be 
traced back to an employee’s unsafe act (Brown, 1984). As the name suggests, the 
systems view puts forward that accidents are caused almost entirely by a faulty system 
(Deming, 1986). Alternatively, the system-person sequence theory suggests that most 
accidents are caused by an interacting system of social and technical forces; and that 
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the employee just finds themselves at the end of a series of interrelated events (Brown, 
Willis, & Prussia, 2000). The later view encompasses a holistic view of the possible 
causes to accidents in the workplace, and it is more likely closer to providing a more 
judicious explanation of safety poor outcomes, but that is as far as it explains – the 
nature and complexity of human-machine interaction remains an unsolved puzzle. 
There needs to be a good relationship or fit between humans and machines, otherwise 
there is a chance for high risk. From this preposition, it can be concluded that both of 
these factors can be the cause of an accident. A case in point is one of the BP Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill (2010) where mechanical faults were the cause of an accident. 
In what remains the largest and worst accidental oil spill in history, an explosion and 
sinking of the deep-water horizon oil rigger operated by BP happened in 2010, off the 
coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The explosion and sinking of the rig claimed eleven lives 
and caused incalculable damage to the environment (The Telegraph, 2014). A sea 
flow oil gusher flowed for 87 days, during which an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil 
was spilled of which a mere 800000 were recaptured during containment efforts (The 
Telegraph, 2014). The incident happened due to a wellhead blowout which allowed 
high pressure methane gas to rise up into the rigger, subsequently igniting, causing 
the explosion. This has been very costly for BP, with 42.4 billion US dollars being paid 
out in fines and settlements (Fontevecchia, 2013). The incident has also led BP 
tainting their brand, losing a large amount of shareholder value, and losing future 
business. This makes a case for further research into the causes of mechanical 
failures that cause safety incidents but is not the focus of this research.   
The Ken Woodward incident (1990) illustrates how human and system factors can 
lead to accidents, not only regarding the person involved in the accident, but also those 
that can prevent, or minimize the consequences of accidents. Ken Woodward was a 
team leader at one of Coke-Schweppes’ factories in Kent, UK. When changing from 
the manufacture of one drink to another a CIP clean process was used to clean and 
sterilize the lines. Having run out of the premixed cleaning product that was usually 
used, the factory decided rather to order the necessary chemicals and mix it 
themselves. Furthermore, the mixing machine broke, and so the mixing of the products 
happened in open containers on a regular basis. On that day Ken, who was neither 
trained nor experienced in the process, was asked to do the CIP cleaning. Ken tried 
to find the appropriate safety gear, which was in an unusable condition due to age, but 
it was not available. When he mixed the two chemicals together there was an 
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instantaneous explosion, seriously injuring him, causing the loss of his eyesight, taste, 
and smell. Additionally, many employees who witnessed the accident needed 
counselling afterwards. Mere hours earlier, an email was sent containing results from 
a lab test regarding the CIP cleaning process, which if circulated internally would have 
prevented the accident from ever happening. The financial implications to the 
company added up to ₤2.6Mn in fines and compensation (www.kenwoodward.co.uk). 
This is just but one of a million related and/or similar safety cases around the world, 
making it worthwhile to invest more in research aimed at providing empirical 
explanations to these poor safety outcomes and more specifically to the lack of safety 
behaviour displayed by employees.  
In the South African context safety incidents have also resulted in the loss of life. An 
example of this is when a temporary bridge over a busy highway slip road in Grayston 
collapsed killing 2 people and injuring a further 21 (Kubheka, 2015). The exact cause 
of the collapse of the bridge was not confirmed, but authorities generally believe that 
there were several missing bolts in the scaffolding that made up the temporary 
structure (Nokwe, 2015).  
Detail around the reasons why bolts were missing is again unclear but illustrates the 
severity of the consequences when this safety behaviour is not displayed by 
employees in the construction industry in South Africa. 
With regards to safety across industries there are differences in terms of the number 
of safety incidents, the type of incidents, and the cost involved. According to The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK, heavy industries such as construction, 
mining, petrochemical, and shipping are the main suspects when it comes to high 
levels of accidents in the workplace. Injuries in the construction industry alone in the 
UK amounted to Billions of Pounds per year in lost revenue and settlement fees (HSE, 
2013).  
Although there are acute and discernible differences across industries, evidence also 
portray differences even within the same industries (HSE, 2013). Industry and the 
nature of work cannot be the only factors that are taken into consideration, as safety 
outcomes across organisations within the same industry differ drastically as well – 
which might indicate that some organisations have certain safety related factors 
(person, organisation, or some other) which other organisations may be lacking or 
might be having at different levels, which then explain the variance. A debunking of 
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such differentiating factors, including the possible interaction among them becomes 
imperative in explaining such a variation. 
In South Africa safety incidents in the construction industry are extremely high with 1.5 
to 2.5 fatalities per week (Shields, 2020). Amongst other factors, the lack of safety 
behaviour is cited as one of the leading causes of safety incidents (Shields, 2020). 
The construction industry employs about 1.5 million workers in South Africa, making 
up around 4% of South Africa’s gross domestic product (NIOH, 2020). Apart from 
being one of the biggest contributors to the GDP of South Africa, the construction 
industry is also one of the biggest contributors to safety incidents in South Africa 
(NIOH, 2020). Although South Africa lacks up to date occupational health and safety 
statistics in the construction industry, the International Labour Organisation estimates 
that 60,000 fatalities occur at construction sites annually which equates to one death 
every ten minutes worldwide (NIOH, 2020). If this statistic is applied to the South 
African context it implies very high fatality rate. 
Even within the same organisation, variance in safety behaviour abounds. 
Accordingly, even when all or most organisational factors that promote safety 
behaviour are in place in an organisation there are still a large number of workplace 
accidents and injuries based on various individual level dimensions. This begs the 
question – what explains such variations, that is, why and how would individuals differ 
on their level of safety behaviour? This question makes permissible research into a 
specific direction to discover what such explanatory factors to safety behaviour are. 
Only by delving into this area can one begin to answer the question of why certain 
individuals engage in behaviours that promote safety in the workplace and why others 
act in ways that militates against safety. Once such explanatory factors are unearthed 
their potentially complex relationships ascertained and their individual and/or 
combined effect on safety behaviour have been determined can one look into how 
these antecedents can be manipulated in such a way as to improve safety behaviour 
in a workforce with the goal of maximising safety performance to improve the 
profitability and sustainability of an organisation.   
 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
When safety in the high risk industries is researched the ultimate goal is to reduce the 
number of safety incidents that occur and thus decrease the number of fatalities and 
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injuries as well as reducing the financial implications associated with the incidents. 
There are a number of different factors that could lead to undesirable outcomes, but 
this study intends to research one specific factor, namely safety behaviour of 
employees. Safety behaviour in employees is influenced by a complex network of 
factors that include human factors and decision-making processes. The field of 
research into these human factors that influence employee safety behaviour is limited. 
Thus the main research problem is to understand why there is variance in safety 
behaviour of employees working in the construction industry in South Africa.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH INITIATING QUESTION 
The research initiating question guiding this study is: “Why is there variance in the 
safety behaviour of employees working in the construction industry in South Africa?”  
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The literature and empirical research objectives states what this study intends on 
achieving. 
 
1.3.1. Literature Objectives 
1.3.1.1. To review the meaning of safety behaviour. 
1.3.1.2. To determine the antecedents and the meaning of the antecedents of safety 
behaviour. 
1.3.1.3. To develop a structural model that explains the influence of human factors on 
safety behaviour OR that explains the relationship between human factors and safety 
behaviour. 
 
1.3.2. Empirical Objectives 
1.3.2.1. To investigate the relationship between the antecedents to safety behaviour 
and safety behaviour in the high-risk industries in South Africa, specifically the 
construction industry. 





Chapter 1 made the argument that safety is a prevalent issue in high risk industries, 
specifically the construction industry in South Africa from a person and financial 
perspective. Several international and local examples of safety incidents and the 
resulting consequences were explored to provide substance to the argument that 
safety should be a primary concern for organisations. Safety behaviour was identified 
as a contributing factor towards safety, and as such the importance of exploring 
literature dealing with the human factors that influence safety behaviour was 
highlighted. Chapter 2 defines safety behaviour and examines safety literature to 
provide a credible base from which to hypothesize about the relationships between 
antecedents to safety behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 highlighted that safety in high risk industries, specifically the construction 
industry in South Africa is an issue. The high levels of fatalities within the construction 
industry reveals the importance of decreasing incidents to curb the loss of life, 
disfigurement, and the financial implications of such events. The focus of this study 
however is to explore the human factors that influence safety behaviour. This chapter 
explores the body of research on safety and safety behaviour in particular in a manner 
that ultimately provides a credible basis from which to theorise about a structural 
model that adequately explains the antecedents to safety behaviour.  
Safety behaviour in individuals a choice that has to be made, therefore it is appropriate 
to analyse the antecedents to safety behaviour within the confines of a decision 
making theory that aptly explains the process which occurs in the human mind when 
making the decision to act in a way that is conducive or contrary to safety. The Theory 
of Planned Behaviour (TPB) is one that can be applied to safety behaviour in the 
workplace. The TPB was adapted by Azjen from the theory of reasoned action put 
forth by Fishbein (1975) and Azjen (1980). The theory has been successful in 
predicting a number of different observed behaviours including but not limited to 
smoking, drinking, health services utilisation, breastfeeding, and substance abuse 
(Azjen, 2013). 
Following a brief analysis of the TPB and the factors therein, several other factors are 
explored. Safety Behaviour as a phenomenon is also unpacked. Throughout Chapter 
2 the relationships between the factors that are explored are hypothesized and a result 
a safety behaviour structural model emerges.  
 
2.2. THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR (TPB) 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) evolved from the theory of reasoned action 
developed by Martin Fishbein (1975) and Icek Ajzen (1980). The TRA aims to predict 
an individual’s intentions to behave in a certain manner at a specific time and place 
(Azjen, 2013), and stated that behavioural intentions are influenced by attitudes and 
subjective norms about a specific behaviour. The theory was later revised to include 
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a third factor – perceived behavioural control, and renamed the theory of planned 
behaviour (TPB). Furthermore, the theory claims that if a person intends to behave in 
a certain manner and if they have the actual behavioural control necessary to perform 
that behaviour they will do so (Ajzen, 1991). A diagrammatic representation of the TPB 
can be seen in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Azjen, 2006)  
 
Note: The Theory of Planned Behaviour is a decision-making theory that attempts to explain the factors 
that influence an individuals behavioural decisions with regards to a specific behaviour. 
 
Attitudes: Attitude toward behaviour is the degree to which performance of the 
behaviour is positively or negatively valued (Ajzen, 1991). It also includes the 
evaluation of the outcomes of performing the behaviour of interest.  
Subjective norm:  Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure to engage or not 
to engage in behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Subjective norms are to a large extent 
influenced by normative beliefs or what can be referred to as the opinions of referent 
others. 
Perceived behavioural control: Perceived behavioural control refers to the individual’s 
perception of the ease or difficulty with which they can perform a behaviour (The 
Theory of Planned Behaviour, 2013), or in other words their ability to perform a certain 
task (Ajzen, 1991).  
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Actual behavioural control: This refers to the extent to which an individual has the 
skills, resources, and other relevant prerequisites to perform the behaviour of interest 
(Ajzen, 1991). The successful performing of a behaviour does not depend solely on 
the intentions to do so, but also on a sufficient level of behavioural control.   
Intention: Intention is an indication of a person's readiness to perform a given 
behaviour, and it is considered to be the immediate antecedent of behaviour. The 
intention is based on attitude toward the behaviour and subjective norm with each 
predictor weighted for its importance in relation to the behaviour and population of 
interest (Ajzen, 1991). 
Behaviour: Behaviour is the manifest, observable response in a given situation with 
respect to a given target. Single behavioural observations can be aggregated across 
contexts and times to produce a more broadly representative measure of behaviour 
(Azjen, 2006).  
The theory of planned behaviour can be expressed as a mathematical function, which 
in its simplest form takes the shape of:  
 
where: 
BI: Behavioral intention 
AB: Attitude toward behavior 
(b): the strength of each belief 
(e): the evaluation of the outcome or attribute 
SN: Subjective norms 
(n): the strength of each normative belief 
(m): the motivation to comply with the referent 
PBC: Perceived Behavioral Control 
(c): the strength of each control belief 
(p): the perceived power of the control factor 
W' : empirically derived weight/coefficient 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour has certain limitations in that it does not consider 
all the variables that have an effect on behavioural intention. It also fails to consider 
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the time frame between behavioural intention and the actual observed behaviour as 
well as the factors that may moderate that relationship.  
This study applies the  TPB to understand the influence the influence of human factors 
on safety behaviour. The flowing sections provides…leading up to the development of 
a comprehensive model.  
 
2.3. SAFETY BEHAVIOUR 
According to the TPB (Azjen, 2006) behaviour is “the manifest, observable response 
in a given situation with respect to a given target. Single behavioural observations can 
be aggregated across contexts and times to produce a more broadly representative 
measure of behaviour.” (p. 1). 
Safety behaviour then can be seen as those manifest behaviours which promote 
safety outcomes or avoid safety incidents. This can be behaviours such as compliance 
with safety regulations or guidelines, the wearing of protective gear, or proactive 
behaviours such as ensuring not being fatigued at work or not participating in 
behaviours that could potentially lead to accidents or be hazardous.Griffin and Neal 
(2006) define safety behaviours as behaviours that constitute work performance for 
safety-oriented tasks (Zhang & Wu, 2014). They go on to divide this definition into an 
in-role-dimension and extra-role dimension. The in-role dimension is referred to as 
safety compliance and encompasses behaviours that relate to maintaining workplace 
safety; and the extra-role dimension, which is referred to as safety participation, 
encompasses behaviours that are in nature proactive but not directly linked to safety 
performance, but none-the-less help to improve organisational safety (Zhang & Wu, 
2014). Based on this, Zhang and Wu (2014) propose a dual process perspective 
regarding safety behaviours. The afore mentioned theorise that an employee’s safety 
behaviour is underpinned by two basic cognitive systems, system 1 is an unconscious, 
autonomous, and effortless processing system that functions at high speed and is 
driven by intuition, heuristics, past experiences, etc.; while system 2 is a conscious, 
controlled, effortful processing system that uses reasoning, fluid intelligence, but to 
name a few in a slow and serial manner (Zhang & Wu, 2014). A compromise in this 
dual processing system can undermine safety behaviour; the question the literature 
review aims to answer is what causes these compromises. The first system is in use 
when an employee does day to day tasks, in which the stimulus they encounter is 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 11 
familiar to them and for which they have developed an unconscious approach for 
dealing with said stimulus (Zhang & Wu, 2014). The second system comes into play 
when an individual encounters stimulus with which they are unfamiliar and for which 
they have not developed processes to deal with that stimuli. This can lead to an 
overloading of available cognitive resources and thus cause the individual to act in a 
way contrary to what is necessary in the situation causing an accident (Zhang & Wu).  
There are various factors that determine employees’ safety behaviour.2.4. 
BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
According to the TPB behavioural intention refers to the motivational factors that 
influence a given behaviour where the stronger intention to perform the behaviour, the 
more likely the behaviour will be performed (Boston University School of Public Health, 
2013). Azjen (2006) goes on to argue that if the behavioural intention is strong and the 
individual has the necessary actual behavioural control, the behaviour will be 
performed. In a safety context, based on the theory of planned behaviour, it is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Behavioural intention has an effect on safety behaviour. 
 
2.5. SUBJECTIVE NORM 
Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure to engage or not to engage in 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Subjective norms are to a large extent influenced by 
normative beliefs or what can be referred to as the opinions of referent others. The 
basic formula derived from the TPB (BI = A + SN + PBC) shows the effect that 
subjective norms (SN) has on behavioural intention (BI). It can therefore be concluded 
that subjective norms is a direct antecedent to intention to behave. The impact of 
opinions of referent others and the effect that safety culture and climate has thereon 
will be discussed in the following section. In a safety context, based on the theory of 
planned behaviour, it is therefore hypothesised that: 
 





2.6. NORMATIVE BELIEFS 
Azjen (2006) refers to normative beliefs as the opinions or perceived behavioural 
expectations of important or referent individuals as seen by an individual. These 
referent individuals can be anyone whose opinion caries weight with the individual and 
can include a husband or wife, family, friends, and even community leaders and those 
to whom the individual looks up to. Azjen (2006) makes the assumption that normative 
beliefs combined with an individual’s motivation to comply with referent people in their 
lives determine the subjective norm. Specifically, the motivation to comply with each 
referent individual contributes to the subjective norm in direct proportion to the 
person's subjective probability that the referent individual thinks the person should 
perform the behaviour in question (Azjen, 2006). The theory of planned behaviour 
hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Normative beliefs have an effect on subjective norm.  
 
As will be discussed in the following section, safety climate is the product of the 
workforce as an entirety and their attitudes and perceptions towards safety behaviour; 
it therefore stands to reason that the subjective norms of individuals in a workplace 
has an impact on the safety climate of the organisation as a whole. It is therefore 
hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Normative beliefs has an effect on safety climate. 
 
2.7. ATTITUDE TOWARDS SAFETY BEHAVIOUR 
Attitude toward behaviour is the degree to which performance of the behaviour is 
positively or negatively valued (Ajzen, 1991). It also includes the evaluation of the 
outcomes of performing the behaviour of interest. The formula derived from the TPB 
(BI = A + SN + PBC) shows the effect that the attitude towards safety behaviour (A) 
has on behavioural intention (BI). The theory of planned behaviour concludes that 
attitude toward safety behaviour is a direct antecedent to intention to behave. The 
impact of factors such as beliefs about the valence of safety behaviour, safety training, 
and personality will be discussed hereafter. In a safety context, based on the theory 




Hypothesis 5: Attitude towards safety behaviour has an effect on behavioural intention. 
 
2.8. BELIEFS OF VALENCE OF SAFETY BEHAVIOUR 
Behavioural beliefs are the expectations of the probability of a certain outcome when 
a certain behaviour is displayed. Azjen (2006) refers to this as the valence of a 
behaviour in reaching an outcome. A person may at any given time have many 
behavioural beliefs with regards to a specific behaviour, but only a small number of 
these beliefs are accessible to them at any given point in time. When behavioural 
beliefs about a specific behaviour interacts with subjective values of the expected 
outcome it determines the attitude of an individual towards certain behaviour. 
Therefore, if an individual is of the belief that displaying certain safety behaviours will 
result in safety performance or will reduce the number of safety incidences in the 
workplace, that individual’s attitude towards that specific safety behaviour will change. 
In a safety context, based on the theory of planned behaviour, it is therefore 
hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Beliefs about the valence of safety behaviour has an effect on attitude 
towards safety behaviour. 
 
There are a number of factors that can influence an individual’s beliefs of the valence 
of specific safety behaviours. One such factor is safety training, which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
2.9. PERCEIVED BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL 
Perceived behavioural control refers to the perception an individual has of their ability 
to perform the behaviour of interest, which is determined by the total available set of 
control beliefs and perception of the resources the individual has access to that will 
either allow or impede them to perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The perceived 
behavioural control can influence behavioural intention, and along therewith be used 
to predict observed behaviours (Ajzen, 1991). The theory of planned behaviour 




Hypothesis 7: Perceived behavioural control has an effect on behavioural intention. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Perceived behavioural control moderates the relationship between 
behavioural intention and behaviour. 
 
2.10. CONTROL BELIEFS 
Control beliefs refer to the individual’s perception of the availability of factors and 
resources that may support or impede them in performing certain behaviour. The 
strength of the control belief is determined by the relative perceived strength of each 
factor that may support or impede the behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The theory of planned 
behaviour therefore hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Control beliefs have an effect on perceived behavioural control. 
 
2.11. ACTUAL BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL 
Actual behavioural control refers to the actual resources and factors that an individual 
has access to that will support them in performing the behaviour. Turning an intention 
into a behaviour is not solely dependent on the strength of the intention, but also on 
the actual behavioural control and individual has (Ajzen, 1991). The theory of planned 
behaviour therefore hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 10: Actual behavioural control has an effect on perceived behavioural 
control. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Actual behavioural control moderates the relationship between 
behavioural intention and safety behaviour. 
 
2.12. SAFETY CULTURE 
There are a number of definitions of safety culture found in literature; the UK Health 
and Safety Commission defines it as "The product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety 
management” (HSC, 1993, p. 3). The International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA, 
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1991) defined safety culture as, “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear 
plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” (Cooper, 
2000, p. 114). A further definition by the British Confederation of Industries defines 
safety culture as “the ideas and beliefs that all members of organisation share about 
risk, accidents, and ill-health” (Cooper, 2000, p. 114). 
In April of 1986 reactor 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded killing 30 
operators and fireman over a period of 3 months as well as causing several more 
deaths later on. One person was killed instantaneously, and a second died as a result 
of injuries later that day in hospital (World Nuclear Association – WNA, 2014). The 
disaster happened during a routine test when a combination of a peculiarly designed 
reactor as well as undertrained crew caused an explosion to occur. The subsequent 
fires caused a vast amount of radioactive particles to be released into the atmosphere. 
The containment efforts lasted for 3 days, and a large number of the individuals 
involved became ill as a result of radioactivity (WNA, 2014). As a result of the 
explosion neighbouring areas are still uninhabitable to humans and will be for many 
more years to come (WNA, 2014).  
The Chernobyl disaster brought about an interest in safety culture and drew attention 
to the impact of managerial and individual characteristics on safety performance (Flin, 
Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000). The term first made an appearance in the 1987 
OECD Nuclear Agency report (INSAG, 1988) on the 1986 Chernobyl disaster (Cooper, 
2000), and its use has grown in popularity in the years since. Cooper (2000) points 
out that unless safety culture is a first priority, which in his opinion it should be in high 
risk industries, it is but a sub-component of organisational culture.  
One thing that the literature reviewed for this study (WNA, 2014; Cooper, 2000; HSC, 
1993; IAEA, 1991) has in common about safety culture is that it is a shared group 
ideology or idea. It can be argued that safety culture is that which holds everything 
together, and influences all the other antecedents to safety behaviour in varying 
degrees. All of the above definitions points to the thoughts and beliefs individuals have 
towards safety (Cooper, 2000). It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 




Schein (1990) states that safety culture is not something which can be easily built or 
constructed, but can only be achieved through the systematic manipulation of 
organisational and individual characteristics that have an impact on safety 
management practices. When analysing which variables to manipulate in order to 
achieve a culture of safety within an organisation consideration must be given to the 
interactive relationship between psychological, behavioural and organisational factors 
(Cooper, 2000). Therefore, rather than being solely concerned with shared 
perceptions, meanings, values and beliefs as many definitions propose, it can be 
argued that organisational culture is, “The product of multiple goal-directed 
interactions between people (psychological), jobs (behavioural) and the organisation 
(situational)” (Cooper, 2000). An example of such a goal directed interaction is the 
implementation of safety training programmes, and it stands to reason that an 
organisation with a very strong sense of safety culture will have a focus on safety 
training and ensuring that their employees are well equipped to deal with any situation 
involving safety procedures, guidelines, or equipment. This in turn improves the 
immediate safety climate in the organisation, as climate can be seen as a snapshot of 
culture at any given point in time. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 13: Safety culture has an effect on safety training. 
 
Hypothesis 14: Safety culture has an effect on safety climate. 
 
As safety culture is an encompassing phenomenon that an employee subscribes to or 
is a part of it can be theorised that it will influence their behaviours not only at work, 
but also in their private lives; for example an employee that believes safety is an 
absolute first priority to themselves and the organisation will very likely make an effort 
to ensure they are not fatigued at work as they know this has an impact on their level 
of safety behaviour. This argument is not limited to fatigue but can be extrapolated to 
a number of other antecedents to safety behaviour.  
 
2.13. SAFETY CLIMATE 
The term safety climate refers to perceptions of policies, procedures, and practices 
relating to safety in the workplace (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Organisational safety climate 
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can be seen as a snapshot of selected aspects of organisational safety culture at a 
point in time (Mearns et al., 2003). This concept particularly refers to employees’ 
attitudes and perception of safety (Clarke, 2006), and according to Griffin and Neal 
(2000) can largely be influenced by management values and is moderated by 
knowledge, skill and motivation level of workers (Hetherington et al., 2006). This 
influence of management can to some extent be explained when the three dimension 
of safety climate and their inter-relationships are examined. It is therefore 
hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 15: Safety climate has an effect on normative beliefs. 
 
There are three dimensions of safety climate, namely management commitment to 
safety, priority of safety, and pressure of production (Bosak, Coetsee, & Cullinane, 
2013). Bosak, Coetsee, and Cullinane (2013) conducted a study in which they tested 
the relationship between these three dimensions of safety climate as predictors for 
safety behaviour. Non-compliance and ignorance to safety policies and procedures 
has been a problem for organisations, and has been linked to workplace accidents 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000) as this non-compliance makes the entire system more 
vulnerable to risk (Reason, 1997). The results of this study revealed an inverse 
correlation between the priority of safety and risk behaviour as well as management 
commitment to safety and risk behaviour given there was high pressure for production. 
When priority to safety and management commitment to safety was low, risk behaviour 
was high; and as priority of safety and management commitment to safety increased 
risk behaviour decreased (Bosak et al., 2013). Furthermore there was a direct 
correlation between pressure for production and risk behaviour (Bosak et al., 2013). 
Bosak et al. (2013) also concluded, based on their results, that the more employees 
perceive that safety is a priority to an organisation and that senior management 
engages in communication and actions that support this priority, the less likely 
employees are to engage in risky behaviour. This validates the claim that safety 
climate is influenced by management and leadership values.  
Safety climate has also been found to relate to procedures and patterns (Zohar, 2000).  
Consistent procedures were shown to represent patterns that reflect the importance 
and prioritisation of safety over competing goals (Hetherington et al., 2006). Bosak et 
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al.’s (2013) agrees with this statement when they claim that when safety is a priority 
employees will be less likely to engage in risky behaviour.  
Safety climate is moderated by the knowledge and skills of workers. This is explained 
by the fact that safety does not happen in a vacuum and that desired levels of safety 
performance cannot simply be achieved by a prioritisation of safety over other goals. 
There needs to be employees that act in a manner that is conducive to safety 
performance. This can be achieved when employees have the relevant knowledge of 
safety policies and procedures and the skill to be able to apply this knowledge in a 
manner that will increase safety performance. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 
2.2. 
Figure 2.2 
Summary of relationship among antecedents, determinants and components of safety performance 
adapted from safety climate and safety behaviour (Griffin & Neal, 2002) Australian Journal of 
Management (27, p70) 
 
The link between safety climate and the dimensions of safety performance, has been 
established (Griffin & Neal, 2000).  
 
2.14. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Situational Awareness is defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of space and time, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988). This stems from 
information processing theory which states that people perceive information via their 
senses, interpret this information and make decisions concerning its meaning and 
relevance based on their previous understanding and current interpretation (Wickens 
& Hollands, 2000). Endsley (1998) postulates three levels of situation awareness. 
Firstly, to form an accurate picture of their situation, individuals must have the correct 
perception of elements in the situation. The second level entails the combination, 
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interpretation, storage, and retention of the relevant information to form a picture of 
the situation; whereby the significance of particular objects and events are understood. 
The final level is projection, and results from a combination of levels one and two. It 
can be argued that this is the most important stage of situation awareness as it is the 
ability of the individual to use the current information in such a way as to predict future 
outcomes of the situation, thereby allowing the individual to better deal with these 
future events by reducing the surprise element (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
Alternatively, Bedny and Meister (1999) theorise that “Situational awareness is the 
conscious dynamic reflection of the situation by an individual. It provides dynamic 
orientation to the situation, the opportunity to reflect not only the past, present and 
future, but the potential features of the situation. The dynamic reflection contains 
logical-conceptual, imaginative, conscious and unconscious components which 
enables individuals to develop mental models of external events” (Stanton, N., 
Chambers, P., & Piggott, J., 2001). 
Figure 2.3  
The three-level model of situation awareness. Adapted from Situational awareness and safety (N.A. 
Stanton et al., 2001, Safety Science 39 p194) 
The third definition of situational awareness found in literature takes the stance that 
situational awareness is “the invariant in the agent environment system that generates 
the momentary knowledge and behaviour required to attain the goals specified by an 
arbiter of performance in the environment (Smith & Hancock, 1995). 
Stanton et al. (2001) integrates these somewhat contradictory definitions of situational 
awareness into a systems approach. They do this by identifying and representing the 
five main elements within the system: the person (comprising three subsystems: 
working memory, mental models, and reflection together with projection), and the 
world. Furthermore there is an interaction between the two main system elements – 
the person and the world (Stanton et al., 2001).  
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Situational awareness can also be categorised in terms of seven elements, according 
to the Human Factor Investigation Tool (HFIT) is divided into seven elements (Gordon, 
Flin, & Mearns, 2005). These seven elements include attention – distraction; lack of 
concentration; divided attention; focused attention; detection/perception – signal not 
detected; visual, verbal or tactile misperception; memory – forget or miss a step; failure 
to consider all factors; place losing error; interpretation – miscomprehension; decision 
making – apply incorrect/inappropriate/partial solution to situation; assumption – 
relating to task, equipment, parts, systems, or procedures; and response execution – 
stereotype take-over, motor variability.  
It is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 16: Situational awareness has an effect on behavioural intention. 
 
Hypothesis 17: Situational awareness has an effect on team situational awareness. 
 
2.15. TEAM SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
 
People inherently act differently in situation where they are expected to act as a team 
when compared to acting as an individual. This can be based on the skills, knowledge, 
and expertise required to complete the task, or based on the psychology of teamwork 
on the individual (Gordon et al., 2005). This elicits the question of whether teamwork 
can have an impact on safety behaviour in individuals in comparison to situations 
where low levels of teamwork or no teamwork is required.  
Teamwork includes shared situational awareness, that is, teams need to have the 
same expectations and common goals for the job (Gordon et al., 2005) – this refers to 
a shared set of safety goals and expected behaviour that is needed to achieve safety 
performance goals. Teamwork requires the buy-in from the individual as well as the 
entire group, as such problems can arise from individual or group deficiencies. It is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
 





Glavin (2011) identified some of the individual and team deficiencies that may occur. 
Individual deficiencies may occur due to the individual simply not possessing the 
professional skills required to work in a team, not be a good team player because of 
personal characteristics, interpersonal conflicts, or the individual failing to recognise 
the importance of working as a team in order to reach safety performance goals 
(Glavin, 2011). Team deficiencies include issues such as unclear specification of 
responsibility, shared misconceptions, development of peer pressure, the formation of 




In order to achieve high levels of safe production and performance in high-risk 
industries such as the petrochemical industry communication is critical (Hetherington 
et al., 2006). Communication can be defined as the exchange of information between 
individuals or groups that provides knowledge, builds relationships, establishes 
predictable behaviour patterns, maintains attention to the task, and can furthermore 
be used a s a management tool (Glavin, 2011). Glavin (2011) goes on to elaborate 
that communication can be one-way or two-way, the difference being that with two-
way communication there is a feedback element.  
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) identifies hazards that act as barriers to 
communication which could be relevant to other heavy industries. These barrier 
include failures during the transmitting process, difficulties due to the transmission 
medium – noise, failure during receiving, failures due to interference between the 
rational and emotional levels of communication, and physical problems in listening or 
speaking (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2006). 
In a study done by the Canadian Transportation and Safety Board (CTSB) analysing 
the communication errors between pilots, masters, and officers on watch in shipping, 
it was found that many times senior workers perceive that their communication is clear 
and understood by their subordinates while the subordinates perceive that this is not 
the case (Hetherington et al., 2006). This can be attributed to the subordinates being 
reluctant to question the senior workers instruction and can lead to misunderstandings 
or misperceptions that result in accidents. Effective communication can also contribute 
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to team situational awareness as well as team working and effective decision making 
(Hetherington et al., 2006). 
Another factor that may act as a barrier to effective communication is that of language 
proficiency. In the aforementioned study by the UK Civil Aviation Authority it was found 
that pilots who were not sufficiently proficient in the language of the captains aboard 
ships often experienced more communication errors. In a study done by the Seafarers 
International research Centre (SIRC) the question was raised if workers that are 
sufficiently proficient in a second language can communicate effectively in emergency 
situations in their second language when other cognitive demands are high (Kahveci 
& Sampson, 2011). The results showed that the results of miscommunication ranged 
from mild annoyance to the creation of potentially hazardous situations (Hetherington 
et al., 2006). 
A study by Thorvaldsen and Sonvisen (2014) on the implications that multilingual 
crews have for safety on board Norwegian fishing vessels revealed some interesting 
findings. The crews on these Norwegian vessels are reported (Thorvaldsen & 
Sonvisen, 2014) to be increasingly multi-national and as a result multilingual, this has 
implications not only for day to day operational tasks, but also for communication  in 
risky situations (Thorvaldsen and Sonvisen, 2014). Although the operating language 
is English, the majority of crew members from Norway and Russia are not completely 
fluent in the language and thus use a mixture of Russian, Norwegian, English and also 
a form of sign language to communicate.  
The use of sign language has proved to be extremely effective not only in operational 
tasks but also in training of crew members, and in dangerous situations (Thorvaldsen 
and Sonvisen, 2014). This is proven by an event that occurred in November of 2008 
when a fire started in the engine room of a fishing vessel whose crew was multilingual. 
The weather conditions and loss of propulsion and electricity made for a potentially 
catastrophic situation, but due to effective communication between crew members and 
safety equipment working as it should the situation was swiftly handled with no loss of 
life or injury (Thorvaldsen and Sonvisen, 2014). It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 19: Communication has an effect on team situational awareness. 
 
The above mentioned study by Thorvaldsen and Sonvisen (2014) illustrates that 
language does have an effect on effective communication between employees and 
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that this may in fact have implications for safety behaviour of employees; but there are 
effective techniques that can be used to curb these barriers caused by language.  
 
2.17. FATIGUE 
Fatigue can be defined as “a state of tiredness that is associated with long hours of 
work, prolonged periods without sleep or requirements to work at times that are out of 
synch with the body’s biological or circadian rhythm.” (Flin, O'Connor, & Chrichton, 
2008, p. 138). Mellor and Winsome (2012) identify a variety of definitions of fatigue in 
the existing literature, ranging from mental and physical impairment (Grandjean, 
1979), to being characterised as task-related (Hancock & Verway, 2001), and as the 
inability to rest or recover (McQueen & Mander, 2003).  
The National Sleep Foundation (2014) reports that although there is no magic number 
when it comes to sleep, the average adult needs between 7 and 8 hours of sleep to 
recover from a day’s activities which is corroborated by the Centre for Disease Control 
(2013). They report that there is an interaction with basal sleep needs and “sleep debt”, 
which comes about when a person does not get their basal sleep requirements in. 
This sleep debt can accumulate over time and lead to a person being drowsy or sleepy 
during the day, which may heavily affect decision making processes and function (The 
National Sleep Foundation, 2014). In today’s society, workers report that they get less 
sleep than what is needed on a daily basis (Glavin, 2011); and a loss of sleep of as 
little as 2 hours can lead to lower performance and alertness levels. A shortage in 
sleep can an also result in longer reaction times, reduced vigilance, cognitive slowing, 
memory problems, time on task decrements and optimum response decrements 
(Glavin, 2011).  
Fatigue has been shown to be a major contributing factor in workplace accidents 
(Swaen, 2003). Mellor and St. John (2011) determined that fatigue was a major 
contributor to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986). In support of this, Hetherington 
et al. suggests that fatigue may have been a contributing factor to the grounding of the 
Exxon Valdez in 1989 owing to the fact that the watch keeper had as little as 5-6 hours 
of sleep in the 24 hours prior to the incident. The consequences of the grounding of 
the Exxon Valdez was environmentally catastrophic and illustrates why it is so 
important to reduce levels of fatigue in workers.  Gawron et al. (2001) stress the 
importance that recovery from fatigue has to take into account the rest needed to 
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sufficiently address the nature, length, and intensity of effort expended during work 
(Mellor & St. John, 2011). As seen in Table 2.1, there are many adverse 
consequences that arise from a fatigued worker, all of which can potentially adversely 
affect safety behaviour in individuals.  
In a study by Mellor and St. John (2011) on fatigue and work safety behaviour in men 
during early fatherhood it was established that there is an inverse correlation between 
fatigue and safety compliance and safety participation, as well as an inverse 
correlation between sleep hours and safety behaviour (Mellor & St. John, 2011).  
 
Table 2.1.  
Summary of the key effects of fatigue. Adapted from Human performance limitations (communication, 
stress, prospective memory and fatigue), by R.J. Glavin (2011). Best Practice & Research Clinical 
Research Anaesthesiology 25 p204. 
 
Summary of the key effects of fatigue. 
(A) Cognitive 
 Adverse effect on innovative thinking and flexible decision making 
 Reduced ability to cope with unforeseen rapid changes 
 Less able to adjust plans when new information becomes 
available 
 Tendency to adopt more rigid thinking and to adopt previous 
solutions 
 Lower standards of performance become acceptable 
(A) Motor skills 
 Less co-ordination 
 Poor timing 
(A) Communication 
 Difficulty in finding and delivering the correct word 




 Become withdrawn 
 More acceptance of own errors 
 Less tolerant of others 
 Neglect smaller tasks 
 Less likely to converse 
 Increasingly irritable 
 Increasingly distracted by discomfort 
 
Shift work contributes to fatigue and as a result causes poorer health and safety 
performance (IskaGolec, Folkard, & Noworol, 1996). 
Based on the preceding argument on effects of fatigue situational awareness, as also 
illustrated in Table 2.1, it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 20: Fatigue has a negative effect on individual situational awareness. 
 
2.18. PERCEIVED STRESS 
Stress can be characterised as the resulting experience an individual gets when the 
demands placed on them outweigh the resources available to them to meet those 
demands (Glavin, 2011). This is supported by the UK Health and Safety Executive 
(2011) in its definition of stress as, “the adverse reaction people have to excessive 
pressure or other demands placed on them.” (HSE, Health and Safety Executive 
Stress, 2011) Furthermore, the UK HSE divides workplace stress into 6 categories: 
(1) Job demands: factors include too much or too little time to complete tasks, too little 
training, and the work environment. (2) Lack of Control: High workload, hours, pace of 
work, and nature of activities. (3) Relationships: Bullying, harassment, among other 
issues. (4) Change: Uncertainty about what is happening, fears about job security, and 
restructuring. (5) Role: Staff feeling that the job requires them to behave in conflicting 
ways. (6) Supervision of managers: Lack of support from managers or unrealistic 
goals. 
Glavin (2011) reports that those working in high-risk settings are subjected to acute 
stressors which can be brought on by high workload, emergencies, or high cost of 
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failure. It is important to examine the nature of these acute stressors as categorised 
by Flin et al. (2008): 
• Environmental: Fatigue and physical environment 
• Novelty and uncertainty: Unknown condition, critical information missing, etc. 
• Task related: Performance anxiety (due to safety consequences, high 
workload, time pressure, personal danger, fear of failure. 
Cooper, Dewe, and O’Driscoll’s (2001) research has shown that stress is a factor that 
adds to the productivity and health costs of an organisation as well as to personal 
health and wellbeing (Cooper, Dewe, & O'Driscoll, 2001). It also commonly known that 
stress has an impact on attention (Ellenbogen et al., 2002), working memory (Ashcraft 
& Kirk, 2001), and perceptual-motor performance (van Gallen & van Huygevoort, 
2000). This has implications for safety behaviour as acting in a safe manner and 
following protocols and other policies depend largely on a choice an individual makes 
and the working memory they have of specific policies and protocols; and if these 
functions are impaired this could very well decrease safety behaviour. 
A study by Ge et al., (2014) analysing the effects of stress and personality on 
dangerous driving behaviours among Chinese drivers gives some insight into the 
effects of stress on a human’s working memory and psychomotor processes. The 
study revealed that global stress was a good predictor of dangerous driving behaviour 
(Ge et al., 2014). Baddeley’s (2001) working memory model states that general 
cognitive processing capacity resources are limited. Because stressful situations 
activate worrying (Eysenck, 1993), worrisome thoughts dominate working memory 
processing and overload the temporary storage capacity of working memory. 
Therefore, a person’s limited attentional resources are not as available for concurrent 
task processing (Eysenck et al., 2007). This shortage of resources with regards to task 
processing leads to stressed individuals placing themselves in more dangerous 
situations in comparison to when their minds are free of stress and other distractions 
(Ge et al., 2014). Ge et al.’s (2014) study  also revealed that specific external stressors 
such as a person being involved in a divorce are more prone to being involved in motor 
vehicle accidents as a result of placing themselves in more dangerous situations than 
they normally would (Ge et al., 2014). Furthermore, the study proves that anger is a 




The results of the Ge et al. (2014) study is not limited to driving behaviour, and it can 
be hypothesised that it can be extrapolated to everyday activities that require working 
memory and attentional resources. These task processing resources are critical for 
workers in heavy industries as they have to be aware of their surroundings, remember 
policies and procedures regarding their work, and not put themselves in unnecessarily 
dangerous situations. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 21: Stress has a negative effect on situational awareness. 
 
2.19. MINDFULNESS 
Zhang and Whu (2014) suggest that mindfulness can improve safety behaviours 
through improving the dual system of safety behaviour. Mindfulness can be defined 
as the quality or state of being conscious or aware of something at the present moment 
in time. Mindfulness can moderate the dual system in a positive way manner (Brown 
& Ryan, 2003), through an improved attention on the present moment (Brown et al, 
2007). Increased mindfulness he individual to better process information received from 
internal and external stimulus (Zhang & Whu, 2014). 
As discussed earlier, system 1 of the dual system of safety behaviour is the 
unconscious part that is driven by intuition and heuristics. Mindfulness is thought to 
reduce the harm of this system, and improve the benefits of it by making the employee 
more aware of their unattended inner experiences and intuitions. (Brown & Ryan, 
2003). Endsley (1995) postulates that mindfulness training can also improve levels of 
situational awareness, it is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 22: Mindfulness has a positive effect on situational awareness. 
 
2.20. SAFETY TRAINING 
Safety training is of critical importance if positive safety behaviour is to be expected. 
Workers cannot only know what is expected of them, but must also know how safety 
performance goals are to be achieved; both as individuals and as a group. An example 
of safety training that illustrates the aforementioned idea is Crew Resource 
Management. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a technique used in the 
maritime industry in which crews are trained in the basic skills needed to cope with 
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emergency situations and meet safety performance expectations (Hetherington et al., 
2006). A similar approach tailored to specific industry or organisational needs can be 
used in order to reduce safety incidences. This allows for employees to acquire the 
knowledge of what is deemed as being safe behaviour and the skills to put that 
knowledge into action. The fact that employees know what safe behaviour is and what 
the outcomes of performing or not performing specific safety behaviours are, 
translates to the knowledge of the valence of specific behaviours. Thus safety training 
has an effect on the beliefs of the valence of safety behaviours on safety outcomes.  
Knowledge of the personal and organisational outcomes of abiding by safety 
regulations and policies will have an effect on the attitude towards safety behaviour. It 
is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 23: Safety training has a positive effect on the beliefs about the valence of 
safety behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis 24: Safety training positively effects attitude towards safety behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis 25: Safety training has a positive effect on safety climate. 
 
Safety training is an opportunity for management and leadership to illustrate that safety 
is a first priority in the organisation, and that safety cannot be compromised on in order 
for operational requirement to be met. The link between management commitment to 
safety and safety behaviours have been proven by Bosak et al. (2013).  Safety training 
is the tool that is used to equip employees with the necessary knowledge, skills, and 
expertise, as well as motivation to behave in a manner that is conducive to meeting 
safety outcomes, turning intentions to behave safely into observed behaviour. It is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 26: Safety training moderates the relationship between behavioural 





According to Havold, Nesert and Strand (2011) fatalism can be defined as the 
perception that individuals have that they have little or no control over outside events 
such as accidents, and may be a reflection of underlying cultural values. 
Due to the apartheid regime of the 1900s, South Africa is a country in which an unfair 
political system and racial segregation caused many people to receive a sub-standard 
education or none at all. This has resulted in large groups of people not being qualified 
or very poorly qualified. High risk industries make use of these groups of people for 
their workforce (Cronje, Reyneke, & van Wyk, 2013) as they are a source of low-cost 
labour. Since a large percentage of the employees in the high risk industries come 
from this social class the effects thereof must be analysed. Cronje, Reyneke, and van 
Wyk (2013) refer to the residential areas from which this workforce comes from as 
labour sending areas (LSA). The residential areas from which these individuals come 
and the social factors they experience within this area have certain effects on their 
psychological processes and how they think about certain things such as fatalism 
(Cronje et al., 2013). One such  Fatalism was identified as a factor that has particular 
bearing on safety and safety behaviour within the high-risk industry. 
Forcier, B.H., Walters, A.E., Brasher, E.E., & Jones, J.W. (2001), identify the similarity 
between fatalism and an external locus of control for safety. An individual with an 
external locus of control for safety will believe that accidents or dangerous situations 
are not within their control which will likely lead to that individual not acting in ways 
that are aligned to preventing or avoiding dangerous situations. In the high risk 
industries such belief could potentially lead to an employee not complying with safety 
regulations or guidelines and in turn translate to a poor interaction between the human 
and machine and as such create safety lapses or incidents. As mentioned by Havold 
et al., (2011), beliefs of fatalism could be a reflection of underlying cultural values, 
which are passed down from generation to generation and enforced by those referent 
others the individual finds themselves around. It therefore stands to reason that beliefs 
of fatalism of the workforce and society could shape the perceived control over 
behaviour of an individual. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 





2.22. TOWARDS A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF SAFETY BEHAVIOUR 
Table 2.2.  
Safety Behaviour Structural Model Key 
 
 
Note. To be read with figure 2.4
ξ1 = Communication and 
Language (COM) 
η1 = Team Situational 
Awareness (TSA) 
ξ2 = Fatigue (FAT) η2 = Individual Situational 
Awareness (SA) 
ξ3 = Stress (STR) η3 = Safety Climate (CLIM) 
ξ4 = Mindfulness (MND) η4 = Control Beliefs (CB) 
ξ5 = Safety Culture (CULT) η5 = Normative Beliefs (NB) 
ξ7 = Fatalism (FTL) η6 = Valence Beliefs (VB) 
ξ8 = Actual Behavioural Control 
(ABC) 
η7 = Safety Training (ST) 
 η8 = Perceived Behavioural 
Control (PBC) 
 η9 = Attitude towards Safety 
Behaviour (A) 
 η10 = Behavioural Intention (BI) 
 η11 = Subjective Norm (SN) 



























































































































Figure 2.4  
Safety Behaviour Structural Model 




This chapter discussed the literature pertaining to safety behaviour and the 
antecedents related thereto. A comprehensive analysis of safety literature provided a 
credible base from which to hypothesize about the relationships between the 
antecedents to safety behaviour, and as a result a comprehensive safety behaviour 
structural model was constructed. Chapter 3 will discuss the research methodology 
that was used to test the various proposed hypotheses on the relationship between 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
A theoretical argument of the antecedents to safety behaviour and their inter-
relationships was set forth in the literature study. This produced a thorough set of 
structural relations that attempts to reach the research objectives. The overarching 
substantive research hypothesis of this study is that the structural model that was set 
forth in the literature study (Fig 2.4.) could provide a credible explanation for variance 
in safety behaviour. This overarching substantive research hypothesis was divided 
into a further 16 hypotheses that attempts to explain the direct effect causal pathways 
of the antecedents to safety behaviour in individuals, or rather how variance in those 
antecedents influence an individual’s safety behaviour. If this model perfectly explains 
the variance in safety behaviour the overarching research hypothesis can be seen as 
an exact fit null hypothesis; this case is extremely rare, and is not expected. The model 
is expected to reasonably explain variance in safety behaviour, and as such it is 
expected that the close fit null hypothesis will be accepted.  
The proposed structural model can be considered valid or permissible when the model 
closely fits the empirical data that has been collected (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In 
order to collect and analyse data in such a way that the epistemic ideal of research is 
satisfied the research methodology needs to be both objective and rational (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2001). Objectivity is the scientific method’s focus on reduction of error, while 
rationality refers to the fact that the validity of findings must be evaluated by 
knowledgeable peers (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). In order to satisfy the above-
mentioned requirements of scientific research a description of the methodological 
choices made will be given with regard to the substantive research hypotheses, the 
research design, statistical hypotheses, sampling, data analysis techniques, 






3.2. AN ABRIDGED SAFETY BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURAL MODEL 
The model that emerged from the literature study is a very complex representation of 
the causes of variance in safety behaviour. Although the relationships are in reality 
complex, one needs to take into consideration the practical implications of testing such 
a model, especially at first generation testing level. The implications of testing the 
complete structural model would result in a questionnaire that may be too long for 
participants to complete and result in response bias or other errors. The sample size 
needed to complete such a study would also be extremely large and may prove 
impossible to complete within given time constraints. It was therefore suggested that 
the safety behaviour structural model be streamlined in order to have a testable 
structural model from which accurate inferences can be drawn. 
When minimising the model it was proposed that all of the variables relating to the 
theory of planned behaviour remain in the model, as this is the “point of origin” for the 
model and provides an accurate representation of the decision making process that 
takes place in an individual’s mind when deciding if they will perform safety behaviours 
or the contrary. In the literature review situational awareness emerged as a very 
important factor in influencing behavioural intentions of individuals, and therefore the 
focus of this research will be on the expansion of the theory of planned behaviour by 
adding the situational awareness variable and those variables that impact upon 
situational awareness. The list of variables that was removed from the original 
proposed safety behaviour structural model are, communication and language, team 
situational awareness, safety culture, safety climate, fatalism, safety training, and 
personality. Once the proposed changes were made the structural model that 





Table 3.1.  
Abridged Safety Behaviour Structural Model Key 
 














Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
ξ1 = Fatigue (FAT) η1 = Individual Situational 
Awareness (SA) 
ξ2 = Stress (STR) η2 = Perceived Behavioural 
Control (PBC) 
ξ3 = Mindfulness (MND) η3 = Subjective Norm (SN) 
ξ4 = Control Beliefs (CB) η4 = Attitude towards Safety 
Behaviour (A) 
ξ5 = Normative Beliefs (NB) η5 = Behavioural Intention (BI) 
ξ6 = Valence Beliefs (VB) η6 = Behaviour (B) 







Abridged Safety Behaviour Structural Model 
 
Note. Key can be found in table 3.1. The abridged safety behaviour structural model is a streamlined version of the model 






3.3. RESEARCH AIM, QUESTIONS, AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research study was to determine whether certain individual differences 
variables can be used to account for variance in safety behaviour amongst employees 
in high risk industries in South Africa. Subsequently, the research initiating question 
for this study was: “Why is there variance in the safety behaviour of employees working 
in high risk industries in South Africa?” This question was addressed through the 
attempt to achieve the following research objectives: 
1. developing a structural model that depicts the dynamics of the variables that can 
possibly account for variance in safety behaviour, and  
2. test the fit of the outer and inner model via Partial Least Squares modelling (PLS).  
3.4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The proposed safety behaviour structural model consists of several latent variables, 
and causal pathways are proposed between these variables.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Control beliefs (ξ4) has an effect on perceived behavioural control (η2). 
Hypothesis 3: Perceived behavioural control (η2) has an effect on behavioural intention  
(η5). 
Hypothesis 4: Actual behavioural control (ξ7) has an effect on perceived behavioural 
control (η2). 
Hypothesis 5: Normative beliefs (ξ5) has an effect on subjective norms (η3). 
Hypothesis 6: Subjective norms (η3) has an effect on behavioural intention (η5). 
Hypothesis 7: Valence beliefs (ξ6) has an effect on attitude towards safety behaviour 
(η4). 
Hypothesis 8: Attitude towards safety behaviour (η4) has an effect on behavioural 
intention (η5). 
Hypothesis 9: Fatigue (ξ1) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
Hypothesis 10: Stress (ξ2) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
Hypothesis 11: Mindfulness (ξ3) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
Hypothesis 12: Individual situational awareness (η1) has an effect on behavioural 
intention (η5). 





If the overarching substantive research hypothesis is interpreted to mean that the 
proposed safety behaviour structural model provides a perfectly accurate description 
of the mechanisms that determine individual safety behaviour, the overarching 
substantive research hypothesis will translate into the following exact fit null 
hypothesis: 
 
Exact fit null hypothesis: 
Ho1: RMSEA = 0  
Ha1: RMSEA > 0 
 
If the overarching substantive research hypothesis is interpreted to mean that the 
proposed safety behaviour structural model provides only an approximate description 
of the mechanisms that determine individual safety behaviour, the overarching 
substantive research hypothesis will translate into the following close fit null 
hypothesis: 
 
Close fit Hypothesis:  
Ho2: RMSEA ≤ .0,05  

















Table 3.2 shows the statistical hypotheses that represent 26 path specific substantive 
research hypotheses into which the overarching substantive hypothesis was divided. 
 
Table 3.2. 









































Note. Statistical hypotheses that represent 26 path specific substantive research hypotheses into which 
the overarching substantive hypothesis was divided. 
 
3.5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001) the research design is the plan with which the 
researcher intends to conduct their research to answer the research initiating question 
that has been identified at the outset. The research design outlines the procedure that 
will be followed to gather data that is required, how that data will be analysed, and 
ultimately how this will answer the initial research question or problem. 
The design enables the researcher to test whether the hypothesised direct effect 
casual pathways between factors in the structural model validly explains variance, 
thus indicating whether or not the structural model as a whole is an accurate 
representation of the investigated factors. In order to achieve the above mentioned 





Ex post facto correlational design 
 
[X11]  [X12] … [X1p]   Y11 Y12 … Y1q 
[X21]  [X22] … [X2p]   Y21 Y22 … Y2q 
    :      :        :    :     : 
[Xi1]  [Xi2] … [Xip]   Yi1 Yi2 … Yiq 
    :      :        :    :     : 
[Xn1]  [Xn2] … [Xnp]   Yn1 Yn2 … Ynq 
Note. A figure illustrating an ex-post facto correlational design as described in the section following.  
 
Ex-post facto design 
The design requires measures on p exogenous indicator variables and the q 
endogenous indicator variables across n observations. The observed covariance 
matrix is subsequently calculated. Estimates for the freed parameters in the 
comprehensive LISREL model are obtained in an iterative fashion with the objective 
of reproducing the observed covariance matrix as closely as possible 
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). If the fitted model fails to accurately reproduce the 
observed covariance matrix the conclusion has to be drawn that the elaborated 
learning potential structural model does not provide an acceptable explanation for the 
observed covariance matrix (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Kelloway, 1998). As 
such the structural relationships hypothesized by the model do not provide an accurate 
representation of the antecedents to safety behaviour and their inter-relationships. The 
converse is not true. If the fitted covariance matrix derived from the parameter 
estimates obtained for the comprehensive LISREL model closely agrees with the 
observed covariance matrix it does not mean that the hypotheses portrayed in the 
structural model necessarily produce the observed covariance matrix. Therefore it 
cannot be concluded that the hypothesised direct effect causal pathways depicted in 
the structural model necessarily must be those that operate to determine variance in 
safety behaviour. This only means that it is permissible to interpret the statistical 
significance and magnitude of the estimated path coefficients and to regards that part 
of the structural model that receives support as one plausible account of the 
antecedents to safety behaviour and their inter-relationships. If the model fits closely 
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it can be concluded that the statistically significant pathways in the model provide a 
valid account (Babbie & Mouton, 2001) of variance in safety behaviour. 
 
In an ex post facto research design the researcher does not have control over 
independent variables or how they present because presentation has occurred 
already or they are not able to be manipulated. (Kerlinger, Floud, Meyer, & Babbie, 
1973). Without any direct intervention, inferences about relations among variables are 
made. As can be concluded, the most important element of an ex post facto research 
design is the lack of control or manipulation that the researcher has. Although it is 
possible to draw subjects at random in a n ex post facto design, it is not possible to 
assign participants to groups at random or to subject groups to treatment at random. 
For this reason the researcher must be aware that participants can select themselves 
into groups based on factors that the researcher may not be interested in (Kerlinger et 
al., 1973).  
 
According to Kerlinger, Floud, Meyer, and Babbie (1973), an ex post facto research 
design has the following limitations: 
• Lack of ability to manipulate independent variables, 
• The lack of ability to randomise, and 
• The risk of incorrect interpretation 
 
Although an ex post facto research design displays all of the limitations mentioned, 
the problems typically found in Industrial Psychology do not lend themselves to 
experimental inquiry because the variables considered are usually not manipulable. 
Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, measures must be taken to avoid 
incorrect interpretation of data. 
 
3.6. SAMPLE AND SAMPLE DESIGN 
The purpose of the research is to discover what the antecedents to safety behaviour 
in individuals working in high risk industries are. The focus therefore falls specifically 
on those individuals that work within the high risk industries such as mining and oil 
extraction and refinery. The target population is the population of employees that work 
within all of these high risk industries. Testing the proposed structural model of safety 
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behaviour on the total population is not practically feasible, and as such a 
representative sample of employees needs to be selected from the target population. 
In order to achieve these goals the target population must therefore be operationalized 
as the sampling population, the sampling population will consist of those final sampling 
units (FSUs) in the target population that has a positive, non-zero probability of being 
selected to partake in the study. The ideal would be for the sampling population to be 
the same as the target population (Theron, 2007), but this is very rarely the scenario 
that is found in practice.  
To select a representative sample a brief analysis of the various methods of sampling 
available to the researcher has been done. These two methods are probability and 
non-probability sampling. 
 
Sampling Methods  
3.6.1. Probability Sampling Methods 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001) probability sampling enhances the likelihood 
of selecting a set of FSUs from a population in such a way that the statistical 
characteristics of specific attributes of those sampling units accurately portray the 
parameters of the total population. In this method of sampling the entire sampling 
population is known and has an equal, non-zero chance of being selected, and as 
such the sample can be seen as self-weighing (Graveter & Forzano, 2003). Examples 
of probability sampling methods include random sampling, stratified sampling, cluster 
sampling, and systematic sampling (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). 
 
3.4.2. Non-probability Sampling Methods 
According to Bless, Higson-Smith, and Kagee (2011) non-probability sampling 
methods refer to the case where the probability of including each element of the 
population in a sample is unknown. It is therefore not likely to determine the likelihood 
of the inclusion of all representative elements of the population into the sample, 
making it impossible to estimate how well the sample represents the population, and 
generalisations become questionable (Bless, et al., 2011).  
Although probability samples are then of a much higher quality than non-probability 
samples, this is often the only option a researcher is left with if population lists are not 
available (Bless et al., 2011). Furthermore, non-probability samples almost always 
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have the advantage of being more affordable, faster, and being adequate for 
homogenous populations (Bless et al., 2011). The representativeness of a non-
probability sample can be increased by increasing the sample size. The types of non-
probability sampling methods available to the researcher are accidental or 
convenience sampling, purposive or judgemental sampling, and quota sampling. This 




This sampling method is the most rudimentary of all the sampling methods and 
involves taking on all the available cases until the sample reaches the desired size 
(Bless et al., 2011). The researcher chose a convenient place, in this case any 
construction sites in the Western Cape Winelands region that allowed access to their 
ground-level staff. The researcher requested that staff made available complete the 
safety behaviour questionnaire. For this research the ideal sample size was larger 
than 200 individuals.  
 
3.7. DATA COLLECTION  
The primary challenge during the data collection phase was to locate a substantially 
large enough sample of willing participants for the study. To locate the sample 
organisations within the Western Cape in the construction industry were approached. 
Access to construction workers was requested from the identified institution, which 
was suitably granted with the provision that the researcher would have to travel to 
various construction sites across the Western Cape and gain verbal permission from 
each site manager to gain access to the workers on that site.  
Over 30 construction sites were approached by the researcher with access gained at 
24 construction sites. Those sites that did not gain access to the researcher did so 
due to operational and time restraints.  
The administration of questionnaires was done by the researcher. Ethical issues were 
taken into consideration. The issues will be discussed in the following section. The 
questionnaires were in a pen and paper format due to the lack of access to computers 
by construction workers. A lucky draw prize was used as incentive for construction 
workers to complete the questionnaire.  
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Due to the time consuming nature of the data collection process, a relatively small 
sample size of 217 construction workers completed the questionnaire.  
 
3.8. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING DATA COLLECTION 
When performing a study and collecting empirical evidence a researcher must ensure 
that the dignity, rights, safety, and well-being of research participants is ensured. The 
purpose of reflection on the ethical risks of the study is to ensure that the above-
mentioned is satisfied. The question that the researcher must ask is whether the 
possible damage or harm that may be caused to research participants is justifiable in 
terms of the results or outcomes of the study (Standard Operating Procedure, 2012).  
The researcher must obtain informed consent all participants before engaging in the 
study. For this to occur the participants must have a clear understanding of the goals 
and objectives of the study and the possible risks that may be involved to them. The 
Standard Operating Procedure (2012) outlines that participants have to be informed 
on the following issues regarding the study: 
- The objective and purpose of the research, 
- what participation in the research will involve,  
- how the research results will be disseminated and used,  
- who the researchers are, what their affiliation is, where they can make further 
inquiries about the research if they wish to do so,  
- what their rights as a participant are, and where they can obtain more 
information about their rights. 
Maybe most importantly, the participants must know that they are free to choose if 
they want to partake in the study. This issue was dealt with by an informed consent 
form (Appendix B) that explained the above-mentioned to research participants and 
allowed them to accept or deny to participate in the study. A copy of this consent from 
can be found attached in Appendix B. The language used in the informed consent 
form is in a vernacular that all participants will be able to understand.  
All data collected was anonymous as there is no reason to know the identity of 
participants. All data was treated as confidential and only the researcher and 
supervisor has access to said data. 
An application for ethical clearance of the proposed research study has been 
submitted, and approved by the Research Ethics Committee Human Research 
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(Humanities) of the University of Stellenbosch. A copy of this Application is attached 
and can be found in Appendix A. 
 
3.9. DATA ANALYSIS 
3.9.1. Missing Values 
Issues regarding missing values in the empirical data collected must be dealt with 
before data analysis can take place. The selection of the method used to deal with 
missing values is dependent on the nature of the data, especially concerning whether 
the data follows a multivariate normal distribution. Four options were explored in order 
to determine the correct method to use. 
List-wise deletion involves the identification and deletion of all cases that have one or 
more items with missing values. The risk associated with this approach is that the 
deletion of too many cases will result in dramatically reduced sample size (Theron, 
2015).  
The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation procedure is argued to be 
more efficient than list-wise deletion (Theron, 2015), but cannot be used in this study 
as no separate imputed data set is created which prevents item and dimensionality 
analysis as well as calculation of item parcels, both of which are needed in this study. 
The multiple imputation method estimates missing values through derivation for all 
cases in the initial sample, thus the imputed data allows for dimensionality analysis 
and the formation of item parcels. The problem with this method is that the multiple 
imputation procedures available in LISREL assume that the data values are missing 
at random and that the observed variables are continuous and follow a multivariate 
normal distribution, and this may not be the case for the empirical data that will be 
collected (Theron, 2015). 
Imputation by matching Is considered to be the safest, most conservative approach to 
accounting for missing values, and assumptions made tend to be less strict than that 
of multiple imputation methods. It involves substituting missing values with real values. 
The real values used to replace the missing values are derived from a single, or 
multiple cases that have a similar response pattern over a matching set of variables. 
The ideal is to use matching variables that will not be utilised in the confirmatory factor 
analysis; this is however usually not possible. The items least influenced by missing 
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values are consequently typically identified to serve as matching variables. By default, 
cases with missing values after imputation are eliminated (Theron 2015). 
 
Item analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and structural 
equation modelling (SEM) was used to analyse the questionnaire data and to test the 
proposed safety behaviour structural model. 
 
3.9.2. Item Analysis 
Once items that could accurately reflect employees standing on a particular latent 
variable were identified an item analysis was conducted. The items that are ultimately 
included in the measure of a latent variable should elicit responses from an employee 
that reflect an accurate portrayal of an employee’s standing on that latent variable, this 
can be represented by a number of item statistics. To calculate these statistics the 
Statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) was used. Firstly, the reliability and 
homogeneity of the item indicators earmarked to represent each latent variable was 
calculated using classic measurement theory item analysis. The reliability of a scale 
is a representation of the degree to which it is free of random error variance; this was 
measured by using internal consistency. The representation of this is given by 
Cronbach’s Alpha – an indication of the average correlation amongst items that make 
up the scale. 
The purpose of this exercise was to allow the researcher to identify those items that 
do not contribute to the internal consistency of a scale, and as such have a negative 
effect on the reliability of said scale. By removing these items the scale produces a 
more valid and reliable reflection of an employee’s standing on the latent variable 
being measured.  
 
3.9.3. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The logic underlying exploratory factor analysis is to investigate the uni-dimensionality 
of each scale or sub-scale in order to determine whether the design intention 
succeeded in measuring a single, indivisible latent variable, and to evaluate the 
success with which each item measures the specific latent variable it was designed to 
measure. According to Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999) 
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exploratory factor analysis is used to uncover the underlying structure of large sets of 
variables.  
Fitting procedures should be done in such a way as to estimate factor loadings and 
test for any unique variance in the model. This study made use of a fitting method 
called the maximum likelihood method, which tests for correlations among factors, 
statistical significance of factor loadings and the fit of the model (Fabrigar et al., 1999). 
In this study, the exploratory factor analysis was done using SPSS software. The 
model comparison technique was used to determine the appropriate number of items 
to be included in the model. This technique not only identifies the correct number of 
items to be included, but also explains the data in a similar way to a more complex 
model with a larger number of factors (Fabrigar et al., 1999). To do this the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) was analysed to determine the degree of the 
fit of the model.  
The RMSEA explains the variance between the model and data that has been 
collected via the degrees of freedom allowed for the model. The RMSEA can be 
interpreted in the following manner: 
• values below 0.5 constitute a good fit; 
• values between 0.5 and 0.8 constitute a reasonable fit; 
• values between 0.8 and 1.0 constitute a marginal fit (MacCallum, Widaman, 
Zhang & Hong, 1999). 
 
3.9.4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
When analysing the fit of the structural model consideration must firstly be given to 
whether the variables used to operationalise the latent variables provide accurate 
reflections of the latent variables they were designed to represent (Theron, 2015). 
Thus the indicator variables must be analysed by testing the fit of the measurement 
model before fitting the structural model. This was done in LISREL. 
To fit the measurement model, the covariance matrix produced by the LISREL 
software was analysed. Maximum likelihood estimation was used. Maximum likelihood 
estimation operates under the assumption that the indicator variables used to 
operationalize the latent variables follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
Confirmatory factor analysis is concerned with the accuracy with which indicator 
variables represent latent variables in the structural model. As such, where the 
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measurement model provides a perfectly accurate representation of the process that 
created the observed inter-item covariance matrix, the measurement model would 
translate to an exact fit null hypothesis: 
 
Ho28: RMSEA = 0 
Ha28: RMSEA > 0 
 
Following from this the measurement model would translate to a close fit null 
hypothesis where an approximate representation of the process that created the 
observed inter-item covariance matrix is seen: 
 
Ho29: RMSEA ≤ 0.5 
Ha29: RMSEA > 0.5 
 
3.9.5. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is used to analyse the relationship between 
multiple factors and the empirical testing of theoretical models (Hair, Black, Badin, and 
Anderson, 2010). SEM can be used in both exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis. In this study SEM was used to analyse the measurement model as well as 
the relationships between factors in the structural model.  
 
Hair et al., (2010) state that Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) allows for the 
relationships between multiple items to be analysed in the empirical testing of 
theoretical models. SEM can be used for confirmatory and exploratory analyses. As 
well as analysing the measurement model, it was used to analyse the relationships 
between constructs in the structural model.  
There are two approaches within SEM, namely the covariance approach, and the 
partial least squared approach (PLS). The different approaches reflect fundamentally 
different philosophies and estimation ideas (Hair, Ringle & Starstedt, 2012). 
 
The covariance-based approach 
This approach is a statistical approach that attempts to confirm relationships between 
variables in a theorized structural model (Hair et al., 2012). The covariance-based 
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approach aims to minimise the difference between the covariance matrix that has been 
implied by the model and the sample covariance model.  
Conversely, the PLS-SEM approach has a predictive objective that aims to increase 
the explained variance of target endogenous constructs that exist within the model 
(Hair et al., 2012). Robins (2014), states that in the cases where theory does not 
provide unlimited explanations for dependent phenomena and the primary goal of the 
study is prediction; the PLS approach offers noticeable advantages as a statistical 
analysis approach for models. For these reason, PLS-SEM was used for this study.  
Partial Least Square (PLS) 
Haenlein and Kaplan (2004) states that PLS-SEM aims to maximize the variance of 
dependent variables as reflected by the independent ones. This approach gives the 
following information: 
1. An inner model (a structural part) that shows the linkages between the 
proposed latent variables, and 
2. An outer model (a measurement part) that shows the linkages between the 
latent variables and their observed variables (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009).  
The outer model was assessed by analysing the reliability and validity of the reflective 
constructs. The validity of the formative constructs was also analysed. Thereafter the 
analysis moved from the outer model (the measurement model) to the inner model 
(the structural model), where the variance of reflective constructs was examined; as 
well as their effect sizes and predictive relevance (Henseler et al., 2009). 
 
Overall model fit was analysed by evaluating the measurement model (outer) and then 
the structural model (inner). 
 
3.9.5.1. Evaluating the measurement model (outer) 
The measurement model’s fit is assessed by evaluating the individual item reliability, 
convergent and discriminant validity (Aibinu and Al-Lawati, 2010; Urbach and 
Ahlemann, 2010). 
Individual item reliability 
The first criterion that is considered when evaluating the measurement model is the 
internal consistency reliability. This is done examining the Cronbach’s alpha criterion 
which provides an estimate of reliability based on indicator intercorrelations 
(Cronbach, 1951). PLS, also supports this with a composite calculation which reflects 
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the extent to which variance in an item is attributed to the construct it intends to 
measure.  This criterion admits that indicators have different loadings and makes the 
assumption that all indicators are equivalently reliable. The composite reliability 
criterion requires a value of at least 0.70, while values below 0.60 are considered 
dissatisfactory (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Convergent validity  
Construct validity was assessed through Convergent validity of the instrument. When 
items of a construct links to items of another construct it is said that convergent validity 
occurs (Ahlemann & Urbach, 2010). PLS uses AVE (average Variance Extracted) to 
assess convergent validity. A value of 0.50 is generally required to indicate good 
convergent validity (Ahlemann & Urbach, 2010). 
Discriminant validity 
Discriminant validity is a process of determining whether the items of an instrument 
are distinct and thus do not indicate other variables (Straub, Boudreau & Gefen, 2004). 
The value of the square root of each construct’s AVE should be bigger than the 
correlations with other constructs. Discriminant validity was also assessed through 
analyzing the cross-loadings of specific items. In other words, it needs to be 
determined that the item’s loading with its specific construct should not be lower than 
its loading with another construct.  
 
3.9.5.2. Evaluating the structural model (inner model) 
The coefficient of determination and path coefficients were analysed to evaluate the 
theorised relationships in the structural model. 
The Coefficient of Determination, also known as the R², determines how much 
variation of each endogenous variable is accounted for by the whole model. Values of 
0.67 are deemed significant; while values of 0.33 and 0.19 are considered moderate 
and weak respectively (Chin, 1998). 
The Path coefficient 
The path relationships reflected in the structural model obtains estimated values. 





3.10. MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS 
Measurement were used to obtain individual respondents’ standing on latent variables 
in the safety behaviour structural model. The measurement instruments used were 
combined and together formed a comprehensive safety behaviour questionnaire that 
respondents completed in pencil and paper format. To gather meaningful and accurate 
data, multi-indicator measures were used. To ensure that the LISREL model is over-
identified two or more indicator variables per latent variable was required. To avoid 
the requirement of an excessively large sample size two or more composite indicators 
variables was calculated for each latent variable by calculating the mean of each set. 
The success with which the indicator variables represent the latent variables in the 
safety behaviour model were empirically evaluated by using data analysis techniques 
like item analysis, exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. The 
number of latent variable item indicators included in each scale and sub-scale were 
intentionally made more in order to determine those item indicators that best describe 
a respondent’s standing on the latent variable in question, and therefore also to make 
up for those item indicator variables that do not successfully describe the latent 
variable of interest. 
 
3.10.1. Variables within the TPB Model 
The variables found within Fishbein and Azjen’s TPB model were measured by means 
of constructing a Theory of Reasoned Action questionnaire as outlined by Azjen 
(2006). This questionnaire is set up in such a way as to elicit responses that give the 
standing of an individual on the latent variable of interest. The questionnaire was 
developed in such a way that the questions pertain specifically to safety behaviour of 
individuals within the high risk industries.  Two items were formulated to assess each 
of the theory’s major constructs, and seven point bi-polar adjective scales were 
employed to elicit standings on the latent variables.  
The variables that were measured using this questionnaire are: 
• Beliefs of valence of safety behaviour (VB) 
• Attitude towards safety behaviour (A) 
• Normative Beliefs (NB) 
• Subjective norms about safety behaviour (SN) 
• Control Beliefs (CB) 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 52 
• Perceived behavioural Control (PBC) 
• Behavioural intention (BI) 
• Actual behavioural control (ABC) 
 
3.10.2. Fatigue 
The fatigue questionnaire was used to assess the severity of fatigue in employees. 
The questionnaire consists of seven items related to the physical symptoms of fatigue, 
and four items related to the mental signs of fatigue.  Responses are elicited via a four 
point Likert scale with weights assigned to each response option. The questionnaire 
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha (α) of 0.89 for the 11 item scale. The subscale of physical 




The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) was used to determine the levels of stress that 
employees experience. It is a subjective measure of stress and is measured by a 
fourteen item scale that elicits responses via a four point Likert scale. The questions 
are very general in nature and easy to understand, as such can be used for a wide 
variety of populations. The questions are also free of any sub-group specific content. 
Over a period of three studies conducted by Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermelstein (1983) 
the PSS achieved coefficient alpha for reliability of 0.84, 0.85, and 0.86.  
 
3.10.4. Mindfulness 
The Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) was used to determine 
employees standing on the mindfulness variable. The MAAS uses 15 items that a 
participant rates on a scale from one (“almost always”) to six (“almost never”). Scoring 
involves calculating mean performance across the 15 items, with higher scores 
indicating greater mindfulness (MacKillop & Anderson, 2007). The Conbrach’s alpha 




3.10.5. Situational Awareness 
The Situational Awareness Global Assessment technique (SAGAT) was used to 
measure an individual’s standing on situational awareness. The SAGAT is a global 
tool developed to assess situational awareness across all of its elements based on a 
comprehensive assessment of the employee’s requirements (SAGAT, 2012). The 
technique used to formulate a situational awareness assessment is available in the 
public domain, and this was used to develop items to measure participants’ situational 
awareness. 
 
3.10.6. Safety Behaviour 
Safety behaviour was measured in the same way that Pousete, Larsson, and Torner 
(2007) measured it in a cross-validation study. The researchers measured safety 
behaviour as the average of three safety behaviour measures. The first two scales 
were developed from the work of Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, and Manuel (1998). Two 
distinct dimensions were revealed as a result of factor analysis of the safety behaviour 
measure reported by Cheyne et al. (1998). The first dimension is measured by 5 items 
and is concerned with participation in organised safety activities (Pousete, Larrson, & 
Torner, 2007), it is labelled structural safety behaviour. The second dimension refers 
to safety activities in daily work in interaction with co-workers and management, it is 
also measured by 5 items, and labelled interactional safety behaviour (Pousette et al., 
2007). The final safety behaviour scale was developed in the study by Pousete et al. 
(2007) with the goal of measuring behaviour promotional of personal protection and 
was labelled personal safety behaviour.  
The reliability of the three scales measured by Cronbach’s alpha (α) was 0.88, 0.79, 
and 0.86 calculated from the empirical data in the study by Pousete et al. (2007). 
 
3.11. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented he proposed hypotheses based on the literature review 
discussed in Chapter 2. The research design, sampling and data collection, as well 
statistical analysis techniques were explored. Lastly the measurement instruments 
used were discussed and their psychometric properties presented. The research 




CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research study was to determine whether certain individual differences 
in variables can be used to account for variance in safety behaviour amongst 
employees in high risk industries in South Africa. In previous chapters a 
comprehensive literature review was conducted from which a structural model 
emerged. It was proposed that an abridged version of the structural model be tested 
in this study due to time, and sample constraints. Following this the research 
methodology used to test whether the structural model is a good representation of the 
theoretical model that was tested was clarified. This chapter reports on, and discusses 
the research results.  
4.2. THE ABRIDGED SAFETY BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURAL MODEL 
Figure  4.1  depicts the abridged safety behaviour structural model that was tested. 
Table 4.1.  
Abridged Safety Behaviour Structural Model Key 
Note. To be read with Figure 4.1. 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
ξ1 = Fatigue (FAT) η1 = Individual Situational 
Awareness (SA) 
ξ2 = Stress (STR) η2 = Perceived Behavioural 
Control (PBC) 
ξ3 = Mindfulness (MND) η3 = Subjective Norm (SN) 
ξ4 = Control Beliefs (CB) η4 = Attitude towards Safety 
Behaviour (A) 
ξ5 = Normative Beliefs (NB) η5 = Behavioural Intention (BI) 
ξ6 = Valence Beliefs (VB) η6 = Behaviour (B) 







Abridged Safety Behaviour Structural Model 
Note. Key can be found in table 3.1. The abridged safety behaviour structural model is a streamlined version 
of the model presented in figure 2.4. The focus of the abridged model is on individual factors so as to avoid 




4.3. ITEM ANALYSIS 
For each of the subscales in the Safety Behaviour model item statistics were 
calculated. The results were then evaluated and based on this the decision was made 
whether poor items were deleted before calculating item parcels and fitting the 
measurement model. The analysis is summarised in the table below. 
 
Table 4.1  









Stress 217 29.600 10 53.686 7.327 .799 
Mindfulness 217 58.070 14 97.291 9.864 .764 
Fatigue 217 22.060 10 23.043 4.800 .684 
Attitude 217 11.820 2 5.225 2.286 .891 
Subjective Norm 217 11.920 2 7.030 2.651 .901 
Normative Beliefs 217 12.060 2 6.200 2.490 .877 
Perceived 
Behavioural Control 
217 10.070 2 15.000 3.873 .952 
Control Beliefs 217 10.674 2 10.674 3.267 .926 
Behavioural 
Intention 
217 9.980 2 13.333 3.651 .935 
Actual Behavioural 
Control 
217 11.550 2 7.499 2.738 .891 
Valence Beliefs 217 12.360 2 3.815 1.953 .798 
Situational 
Awareness 
217 27.690 6 70.309 8.385 .829 
Safety Behaviour 217 67.620 12 155.052 12.452 .896 
 
The results of the item analysis for each subscale are presented individually below. 
Subscale 1 (Stress) 
Once the results were analysed it was evident that no extreme low or high means were 
observed in the Stress subscale. Further, item deviations from standard distribution 
were not markedly different from distributions generally observed for other items. This 
leads to the conclusion that all items were adequately sensitive.  
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When the inter-item correlation matrix is scrutinised, it reveals that STR7 does not 
correlate sufficiently (rij<.30) with other items in the subscale. Subsequently the effect 
on scale variance when removing STR7 must be investigated.  
Table 4.2 
Inter-item correlation matrix for Stress subscale 
 STRESS7 
STRESS 1 -0.160 
STRESS 2 -0.225 
STRESS 3 -0.190 
STRESS 4 -0.179 
STRESS 5 -0.181 
STRESS 6 -0.364 
STRESS 7 1.00 
STRESS 8 -0.205 
STRESS 9 -0.081 
STRESS 10 -0.364 
 
When STR7 is removed from the scale, scale variance is significantly reduced. This is 
presented in table 4.3. Additionally, the lower inter-item correlation and squared 
multiple correlation results are indicative that STR7 is a problematic item.  
 
Table 4.3 
Item total statistics for Stress subscales 












Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
STRESS1 26.44 40.932 0.684 0.625 0.754 
STRESS2 26.40 40.814 0.641 0.627 0.759 
STRESS3 26.23 41.678 0.646 0.543 0.760 
STRESS4 26.79 42.140 0.633 0.456 0.762 
STRESS5 26.87 42.579 0.631 0.511 0.763 
STRESS6 26.73 43.384 0.526 0.464 0.774 
STRESS7 26.41 57.891 -0.316 0.214 0.857 
STRESS8 27.14 44.277 0.548 0.475 0.773 
STRESS9 26.32 44.181 0.466 0.242 0.782 




The current Cronbach alpha of .799 for the subscale falls below the cut-off value of 
0.80 for this study. In order to sufficiently raise this statistic, the Cronbach alpha if item 
deleted statistic was analysed. Consequently, if STR7 is removed from the subscale 
the Cronbach alpha result increases substantially to 0.857, confirming that STR7 is a 
problematic item. As such, the decision was made to remove STR7 from the Stress 
subscale.  
 
Subscale 2 (Mindfulness) 
Once the results were analysed it was evident that no extreme low or high means were 
observed in the Stress subscale. Further, item deviations from standard distribution 
were not markedly different from distributions generally observed for other items. This 
leads to the conclusion that all items were adequately sensitive.  
When the inter-item correlation matrix is scrutinised, it reveals that MND4, MND12, 
and MND13 do not correlate sufficiently (rij<.30) with other items in the subscale. 
Subsequently the effect on scale variance when removing MND4, MND12, and 
MND13 must be investigated.  
Table 4.4 
Inter-item correlation matrix for Mindfulness subscales 
 MND4 MND12 MND13 
MND1 0.035 -0.078 -0.018 
MND2 0.553 -0.034 -0.029 
MND3 0.215 0.022 -0.084 
MND4 1.000 0.196 -0.071 
MND5 0.034 -0.172 -0.012 
MND6 0.007 -0.004 -0.035 
MND7 -0.060 -0.011 0.066 
MND8 -0.101 -0.034 -0.033 
MND9 -0.149 -0.107 -0.015 
MND10 -0.199 0.003 0.098 
MND11 -0.135 -0.001 0.119 
MND12 0.196 1.000 -0.118 
MND13 -0.071 -0.118 1.000 
MND14 -0.141 -0.044 -0.50 




When MND4, MND12, and MND13 are removed from the scale, scale variance is 
significantly reduced. This is presented in table 4.5. Additionally, the lower inter-item 
correlation and squared multiple correlation results are indicative that MND4, MND12, 
and MND13 are problematic items.  
 
Table 4.5 
Item total statistics for Mindfulness subscales 












Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
MND1 54.20 84.024 0.384 0.476 0.749 
MND2 53.48 85.381 0.340 0.482 0.754 
MND3 53.59 83.705 0.405 0.317 0.747 
MND4 54.25 94.699 0.025 0.454 0.782 
MND5 54.73 86.504 0.327 0.563 0.755 
MND6 54.74 85.852 0.258 0.481 0.752 
MND7 53.73 77.021 0.631 0.489 0.721 
MND8 53.77 78.521 0.658 0.711 0.721 
MND9 54.39 80.164 0.549 0.579 0.732 
MND10 54.12 81.260 0.548 0.661 0.733 
MND11 53.93 84.611 0.388 0.393 0.749 
MND12 53.10 97.440 -0.054 0.144 0.778 
MND13 53.31 96.552 -0.020 0.099 0.779 
MND14 53.61 81.072 0.588 0.567 0.730 
Note. MND is Mindfulness 
 
The current Cronbach alpha of .764 for the subscale falls below the cut-off value of 
0.80 for this study. In order to sufficiently raise this statistic, the Cronbach alpha if item 
deleted statistic was analysed. Consequently, if MND4, MND12, and MND13 are 
removed from the subscale the Cronbach alpha result increases substantially to 0.782, 
0.778, and 0.779 respectively, confirming that these are problematic items. As such, 
the decision was made to remove these items from the Mindfulness subscale. 
 
When analysis was repeated without these items a Cornbrach’s alpha value of 0.815 





Subscale 3 (Fatigue) 
Once the results were analysed it was evident that no extreme low or high means were 
observed in the Stress subscale. Further, item deviations from standard distribution 
were not markedly different from distributions generally observed for other items. This 
leads to the conclusion that all items were adequately sensitive.  
When the inter-item correlation matrix is scrutinised, it reveals that FAT2, and FAT4 
do not correlate sufficiently (rij<.30) with other items in the subscale. Subsequently the 
effect on scale variance when removing FAT2, and FAT4 must be investigated. 
 
Table 4.6 
Inter-item correlation matrix for Fatigue subscales 
 FAT2 FAT4 
FAT1 0.261 -0.010 
FAT2 1.000 -0.111 
FAT3 0.156 -0.155 
FAT4 -0.111 1.000 
FAT5 0.087 -0.061 
FAT6 0.021 0.016 
FAT7 0.099 -0.018 
FAT8 0.080 -0.067 
FAT9 0.088 -0.073 
FAT10 0.123 0.048 
Note. FAT is Fatigue 
 
When FAT2, and FAT4 are removed from the scale, scale variance is significantly 
reduced. This is presented in table 4.7. Additionally, the lower inter-item correlation 
and squared multiple correlation results are indicative that FAT2, and FAT4 are 













Item total statistics for Fatigue subscales 












Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
FAT1 19.36 17.972 0.471 0.266 0.631 
FAT2 19.21 20.369 0.187 0.102 0.688 
FAT3 19.79 19.603 0.302 0.154 0.665 
FAT4 20.80 23.218 -0.087 0.056 0.703 
FAT5 19.56 18.275 0.456 0.361 0.635 
FAT6 19.67 18.453 0.388 0.295 0.649 
FAT7 19.86 17.666 0.482 0.322 0.628 
FAT8 19.76 18.405 0.408 0.274 0.645 
FAT9 20.34 19.318 0.387 0.310 0.650 
FAT10 20.15 19.978 0.276 0.276 0.670 
Note. FAT is Fatigue 
 
The current Cronbach alpha of .684 for the subscale falls below the cut-off value of 
0.80 for this study. In order to sufficiently raise this statistic, the Cronbach alpha if item 
deleted statistic was analysed. Consequently, if FAT2 and FAT4 are removed from 
the subscale the Cronbach alpha result increases substantially to 0.688 and 0.703 
respectively, confirming that these are problematic items. As such, the decision was 
made to remove these items from the Fatigue subscale. 
 
When analysis was repeated without these items a Cornbrach’s alpha value of 0.711 
was returned.   
 
Subscale 4 (Attitude) 
None of the items in the Attitude subscale had extreme low or extreme high means. 
None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart from the 
typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
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When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.891 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Attitude 
subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 5 (Subjective Norm) 
None of the items in the Subjective Norm subscale had extreme low or extreme high 
means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart from 
the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.901 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Subjective 
Norm subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 6 (Normative Beliefs) 
None of the items in the Normative Beliefs subscale had extreme low or extreme high 
means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart from 
the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
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concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.877 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Normative 
Beliefs subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 7 (Perceived Behavioural Control) 
None of the items in the Perceived Behavioural Control subscale had extreme low or 
extreme high means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set 
them apart from the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can 
therefore be concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this 
subscale show themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate 
moderately (rij>.30) with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.952 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Perceived 






Subscale 8 (Control Beliefs) 
None of the items in the Control Beliefs subscale had extreme low or extreme high 
means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart from 
the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.926 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Control 
Beliefs subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 9 (Behavioural Intention) 
None of the items in the Behavioural Intention subscale had extreme low or extreme 
high means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart 
from the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.935 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
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in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the 
Behavioural Intention subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 10 (Actual Behavioural Control) 
None of the items in the Actual Behavioural Control subscale had extreme low or 
extreme high means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set 
them apart from the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can 
therefore be concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this 
subscale show themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate 
moderately (rij>.30) with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.891 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Actual 
Behavioural Control subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 11 (Valence Beliefs) 
None of the items in the Valence Beliefs subscale had extreme low or extreme high 
means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart from 
the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
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The Cronbach alpha of 0.798 for the current subscale is marginally below the cut-off 
value of 0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from 
the scale, this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to 
changes in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will 
adversely affect the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items 
in the Valence Beliefs subscale were retained.  
 
Subscale 12 (Situational Awareness) 
 
None of the items in the Situational Awareness subscale had extreme low or extreme 
high means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart 
from the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. The inter-item correlation 
matrix for the Situational Awareness subscale is shown in Table 4.8 Item SA5 shows 
itself as a questionable item in Table 4.8 in that it tends to correlate low (rij<.30) with 
the majority of the other items in the subscale. 
Table 4.8 








Note. SA is Situational Awareness. 
 
The removal of item SA5 shows that scale variance reduces significantly. This supports 
the conclusion that SA5 is problematic. The item-total correlation and squared multiple 











Item total statistics for Situational Awareness subscales 












Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
SA1 23.22 47.238 0.656 0.853 0.789 
SA2 23.31 46.270 0.726 0.695 0.772 
SA3 23.30 46.470 0.763 0.851 0.765 
SA4 23.25 46.919 0.713 0.804 0.776 
SA5 21.97 67.281 0.075 0.032 0.874 
SA6 23.39 48.812 0.611 0.844 0.799 
Note. SA is Situational Awareness. 
 
The current Cronbach alpha of .829 for the subscale falls above the cut-off value of 
0.80 for this study. Because SA5 was a problem item, the Cronbach alpha if item 
removed statistic was consulted. This showed that removing SA5 would increase the 
Cronbach’s alpha to 0.874 confirming that SA5 is a problem item. As such, the 
decision was made to remove this item from the Situational Awareness subscale. 
 
Subscale 13 (Safety Behaviour) 
None of the items in the Safety Behaviour subscale had extreme low or extreme high 
means. None of the items displayed small standard deviations that set them apart from 
the typical distributions observed for the majority of the items. It can therefore be 
concluded that all the items were sufficiently sensitive. No items in this subscale show 
themselves as questionable items in that they all tend to correlate moderately (rij>.30) 
with each other. 
When scale variance is investigated it reveals that removing any individual item from 
the subscale reduces scale significantly, this confirms that there are not problematic 
items. Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation statistics supports the 
aforementioned conclusion.  
The Cronbach alpha of 0.896 for the current subscale is above the cut-off value of 
0.80 set for this study. When each of the items are individually removed from the scale, 
this statistic decreases which shows that each item individually responds to changes 
in the latent variable. Consequently, removing any of these items will adversely affect 
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the internal consistency of the subscale. Therefore, each of the items in the Safety 
Behaviour subscale were retained.  
 
 
Summary of Item Analysis 
The item analysis section of this chapter evaluates how successfully items reflected 
performance dimensions as measured by the Safety Behaviour Questionnaire. When 
developing the questionnaire, the intention was to construct a one-dimensional set of 
items that accurately represent variance in variables in the Safety behaviour model. 
Item analysis reveals if this was achieved.  
Several item statistics including item-total correlations, squared multiple correlations, 
inter item correlations, and Cronbach alpha coefficients. To satisfy the status of 
achieved, the item-total correlations, squared multiple correlations, and inter-item 
correlations should moderately highly correlate, and the Cronbach’s alpha should be 
higher than 0.80.  
As a result of this analysis, the majority of items satisfied the requirements. Further, 
seven items were identified as problematic enough to remove them from their 
respective subscales. The summary of these statistic after the removal of seven items 












































Stress 217 26.41 10 1 9 57.891 7.609  .799  .857 
Mindfulnes
s 
217  44.52 14 3 11 94.121 9.702 .764 .815 
Fatigue 217  17.95 10 2 8 20.446 4.522 .684  .711 
Attitude 217  11.82 2  0 2 5.225  2.286  .891 N/A 
Subjective 
Norm 
217  11.92 2 0 2 7.030 2.651 .901 N/A 
Normative 
Beliefs 




217  10.07 2 0 2 15.000 3.873 .952 N/A 
Control 
Beliefs 
217  10.674 2 0 2 10.674 3.267 .926 N/A 
Behavioural 
Intention 




217  11.55 2 0 2 7.499 2.738 .891 N/A 
Valence 
Beliefs 
217  12.36 2 0 2 3.815  1.953 .798 N/A 
Situational 
Awareness 
217  21.97 6 1 5 67.281 8.203 .829 .874 
Safety 
Behaviour 
217 67.62 12 0 12 155.052 12.452 .896 N/A 
 
 
4.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis aims to explore the underlying theoretical structure 
between variables in a scale or subscale to reduce data to a smaller set of summary 
variables. Exploratory factor analysis condenses variables into highly correlated 
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groups that measure a single underlying construct by first examining the pairwise 
relationship between different variables. In this study, exploratory factor analysis was 
performed using R-type factor analysis that involves calculating factors from a 
correlation matrix (Hair, Babin, & Anderson, 2018). 
 
SPSS was used to perform a series of thirteen exploratory factor analyses on the items 
comprising the subscales of the Safety Behaviour questionnaire. Table 4.11 is a 
summary of the results of the factor analyses. 
 
Table 4.11 
Summary results for factor analysis of all scales 
Subscale  Determinant  KMO  Bartlett X2  % Variance 
explained  
No. of factors 
extracted  
Stress .023 .859 799.436  52.678 2  
Mindfulness .008 .821 1028.228 56.165 3  
Fatigue .222 .742 319.377 36.639 2  
Attitude .347  .500 226.766  80.721  1  
Subjective 
Norm 
.327  .500  239.771  81.979  1  
Normative 
Beliefs 




.173 .500  376.655  90.890  1  
Control 
Beliefs 
.255 .500  292.841  86.202  1  
Behavioural 
Intention 




.355  .500  221.975  90.233  1  
Valence 
Beliefs 
.558 .500 125.313 66.430 1 
Situational 
Awareness 
.008 .710 1035.565 86.736 2 
Safety 
Behaviour 




4.4.1. Factor Analyzability of the Inter-Item Correlation Matrix  
In this study, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure as well as Bartlett’s test was used to 
examine factor analyzability of the inter-item correlation matrices. Scores are 
expressed as a number between 0 and 1, values closer to 1 being considered better. 
Sricharoena and Buchenrieder (2005) states that higher scores will be achieved when 
items represent a single common underlying factor. The assumption can then be made 
that when this factor is controlled, the correlation between items will be close to 0.  
In the case of the Safety Behaviour questionnaire KMO values ranges between .5 and 
.859. This indicates that all the correlation matrices are factor analysable. 
 
To test the null hypothesis that the inter-item correlation matrix is an identity matrix in 
the parameter, the Bartlett test of sphericity was used. With the Safety Behaviour 
questionnaire, the stated null hypothesis could be rejected for all of the 13 subscales. 
This implies that the correlation matrices are all factor analysable. 
 
Further, the inter-item correlation matrices showed that all thirteen subscales showed 
significant (p<0.05) correlations), which supports the conclusion that that subscale 
correlation matrices are factor analysable.  
 
4.4.2. Factor Extraction Method 
Principal axis factor analysis was used to factor analyse the thirteen subscales as it 
produced factor decomposition that was easily interpreted.  
 
4.4.2.1. Decision on the Number of Factors to Extract 
To determine the number of factors that would be extracted in this study, the 
eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion and scree test was used. The eigenvalue 
represents that variance that a factor account for (Hardy & Bryman, 2004). To make 
the decision on the number of factors to extract, the eigenvalues are calculated in a 
correlation matrix. Factors with an eigenvalue of 1.00 or higher are retained, while 
factors with an eigenvalue of less than 1.00 would be rejected. The problem lies with 
the fact that factors with a value either just above or below the cut-off value may be 
falsely rejected or retained. Hardy and Bryman (2004) overcome this problem by 
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extracting both more and fewer factors than suggested by the eigenvalue greater than 
one rule to assess whether factors are meaningful when rotated.  
 
4.4.2.2. Rotation of Extracted Factors 
Factors are re-oriented to make factors more easily interpretable through rotation 
(Powell & Peng, 1989). Although a number of options exist to choose from, the rotation 
of factors in this study was done using a varimax rotation method.  
 
4.4.2.3. Differential Skewness 
For this study, the majority of items showed a significantly (p<0.05) negatively skewed 
and leptokurtic distribution. It can therefore be assumed that the likelihood that 
differential item characteristics accounting for factor fission observed is low.  
 
Stress 
When designing the Stress subscale the intention was that each of the 9 items should 
represent a single underlying performance dimension. The EFA output evaluation 
reveals that two factors are required to sufficiently explain correlations between the 
items of the subscale. Two items have eigenvalues-greater-than-one, which is 
confirmed by analysis of the scree plot.  
To analyse whether this represents meaningful fission of the Stress dimension the 
rotated factor matrix must be consulted. In this matrix, it is clear that items STR1-STR9 
have larger loadings on the first factor (>.5) while item STR10 has a larger loading on 
factor two (>.5). STR6, STR7, and STR10 load on both factors. 
When the wording of the item loadings was inspected it was found that each of the 
two factors elicit responses that represent different sub-dimensions of Stress. 
When residuals between observed and reproduced correlations were calculated it was 
found that only 3 (8%) of the residuals were non-redundant with an absolute value 
greater than .05. It can therefore be concluded that the extracted two-factor solution 
accurately provides an explanation for the observed inter-item correlation matrix. This 
leads to the further conclusion that unidimensionality for the STR subscale is not 
corroborated as 32.011% of variance is accounted for by factor 1, and 20.667% of 
variance accounted for by factor 2. 
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SPSS was used to extract a single factor, and determine loadings of items on that 
factor, with the purpose of analysing how well items reflect a single underlying 
performance dimension.  
STR10 proved to be the only problematic item, as it was the only item to have a loading 
of higher than 0.50 on the single factor. The residual correlation matrix reveals that 
61% of residual correlations are large. From these results it can be concluded that a 
single factor solution sufficiently explains the observed correlation matrix, and that all 
items with the exception of STR10 sufficiently reflects a single second-order 
underlying factor.  
Because item STR10 has a borderline loading of 0.408 it was decided to retain it in 
the subscale for this analysis, but to flag it as a borderline questionable item for future 
analysis of the Safety Behaviour Questionnaire.  
 
Mindfulness 
When designing the Mindfulness subscale the intention was that each of the 11 items 
should represent a single underlying performance dimension. The EFA output 
evaluation reveals that three factors are required to sufficiently explain correlations 
between the items of the subscale. Three items have eigenvalues-greater-than-one, 
which is confirmed by analysis of the scree plot.  
To analyse whether this represents meaningful fission of the Mindfulness dimension 
the rotated factor matrix must be consulted. In this matrix, it is clear that items MND7, 
MND8, MND9, MND10, MND11, and MND14 have larger loadings on the first factor 
(>.5) while items MND1 and MND5 has a larger loading on factor two (>.5), and lastly 
MND2 and MND3 have a larger loading on factor 3 (>.5).  
When the wording of the item loadings was inspected it was found that each of the 
three factors elicit responses that represent different sub-dimensions of Mindfulness. 
When residuals between observed and reproduced correlations were calculated it was 
found that only 4 (7%) of the residuals were non-redundant with an absolute value 
greater than .05. It can therefore be concluded that the extracted three-factor solution 
accurately provides an explanation for the observed inter-item correlation matrix. This 
leads to the further conclusion that unidimensionality for the MND subscale is not 
corroborated as 30.005% of variance is accounted for by factor 1, 16.355% of variance 
accounted for by factor 2, and 9.80% of variance accounted for by factor 3 . 
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SPSS was used to extract a single factor, and determine loadings of items on that 
factor, with the purpose of analysing how well items reflect a single underlying 
performance dimension.  
Items MND7, MND8, MND9, MND10, MND11, and MND14 (>.3) have loadings 
greater than .50 on the single factor, while the rest have lower loadings. In the residual 
correlation matrix 72% of the residual correlations are large suggesting that the single 
factor solution still manages to adequately explain the observed correlation matrix. 
This evidence shows that items MND7, MND8, MND9, MND10, MND11, and MND14 
satisfactorily reflect a single second-order underlying factor. Item MND1, MND2, 
MND3, MND5, and MND6 have lower loading as shown in Table 4.39 Based on the 
evidence produced by factor analysis it was decided to flag these items as a 
borderline, questionable item for future analysis on the Safety Behaviour 
Questionnaire but to retain it in subscale MND for the current analysis. 
 
Fatigue 
When designing the Fatigue subscale the intention was that each of the 8 items should 
represent a single underlying performance dimension. The EFA output evaluation 
reveals that two factors are required to sufficiently explain correlations between the 
items of the subscale. Two items have eigenvalues-greater-than-one, which is 
confirmed by analysis of the scree plot.  
To analyse whether this represents meaningful fission of the Fatigue dimension the 
rotated factor matrix must be consulted. In this matrix, it is clear that all items with the 
exception of FAT10 have larger loadings on the first factor (>.5) while item FAT10 has 
a larger loading on factor two (>.5).  
When the wording of the item loadings was inspected it was found that each of the 
three factors elicit responses that represent different sub-dimensions of Fatigue. 
When residuals between observed and reproduced correlations were calculated it was 
found that only 5 (17%) of the residuals were non-redundant with an absolute value 
greater than .05. It can therefore be concluded that the extracted two-factor solution 
accurately provides an explanation for the observed inter-item correlation matrix. This 
leads to the further conclusion that unidimensionality for the FAT subscale is not 
corroborated as 24.641% of variance is accounted for by factor 1, and 15.998% of 
variance accounted for by factor 2. 
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SPSS was used to extract a single factor, and determine loadings of items on that 
factor, with the purpose of analysing how well items reflect a single underlying 
performance dimension.  
Items FAT1, FAT5, FAT6, and FAT7 (>.3) have loadings greater than .50 on the single 
factor. In the residual correlation matrix 71% of the residual correlations are large 
suggesting that the single factor solution still manages to adequately explain the 
observed correlation matrix. This evidence shows that all items except FAT3, FAT8, 
FAT9, and FAT10 satisfactorily reflect a single second-order underlying factor. These 
items have a lower loading. Based on the evidence produced by factor analysis it was 
decided to flag these items as a borderline, questionable items for future analysis on 




When the unidimensionality assumption for the Attitude subscale is tested it was found 
that items comprising the subscale all represent a single underlying performance 
factor. Both items load satisfactorily on the extracted factor (>0.50). Only one item has 
an eigenvalue greater than one, which is supported by the scree plot.  
The unidimensionality assumption for subscale SN is therefore corroborated. 80.721% 
of the total subscale variance can be explained by the extracted factor. 
 
Situational Awareness 
When designing the Situational Awareness subscale the intention was that each of 
the 5 items should represent a single underlying performance dimension. The EFA 
output evaluation reveals that two factors are required to sufficiently explain 
correlations between the items of the subscale. Two items have eigenvalues-greater-
than-one, which is confirmed by analysis of the scree plot.  
To analyse whether this represents meaningful fission of the Situational Awareness 
dimension the rotated factor matrix must be consulted. In this matrix, it is clear that all 
items have larger loadings on the first factor (>.5) while items SA1 and SA6 loads on 
both factors, albeit more on the first factor. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 76 
When the wording of the item loadings was inspected it was found that each of the 
three factors elicit responses that represent different sub-dimensions of Situational 
Awareness. 
When residuals between observed and reproduced correlations were calculated it was 
found that none of the residuals were non-redundant with an absolute value greater 
than .05. It can therefore be concluded that the extracted two-factor solution accurately 
provides an explanation for the observed inter-item correlation matrix. This leads to 
the further conclusion that unidimensionality for the SA subscale is not corroborated 
as 49.228% of variance is accounted for by factor 1, and 37.509% of variance 
accounted for by factor 2. 
SPSS was used to extract a single factor, and determine loadings of items on that 
factor, with the purpose of analysing how well items reflect a single underlying 
performance dimension.  
All items have loadings greater than .50 on the single factor. In the residual correlation 
matrix 100% of the residual correlations are large suggesting that the single factor 
solution still manages to adequately explain the observed correlation matrix. 
 
Safety Behaviour 
When designing the Safety Behaviour subscale the intention was that each of the 12 
items should represent a single underlying performance dimension. The EFA output 
evaluation reveals that three factors are required to sufficiently explain correlations 
between the items of the subscale. Three items have eigenvalues-greater-than-one, 
which is confirmed by analysis of the scree plot.  
To analyse whether this represents meaningful fission of the Safety Behaviour 
dimension the rotated factor matrix must be consulted. In this matrix, it is clear that 
items B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8 and B9 have larger loadings on the first factor 
(>.5) while items B11 and B12 have a larger loading on factor two (>.5), and lastly B10 
a larger loading on factor 3 (>.5).  
When the wording of the item loadings was inspected it was found that each of the 
three factors elicit responses that represent different sub-dimensions of Safety 
Behaviour. 
When residuals between observed and reproduced correlations were calculated it was 
found that only 7 (10%) of the residuals were non-redundant with an absolute value 
greater than .05. It can therefore be concluded that the extracted three-factor solution 
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accurately provides an explanation for the observed inter-item correlation matrix. This 
leads to the further conclusion that unidimensionality for the SB subscale is not 
corroborated as 37.935% of variance is accounted for by factor 1, 15.957% of variance 
accounted for by factor 2, and 12.437% of variance accounted for by factor 3 . 
SPSS was used to extract a single factor, and determine loadings of items on that 
factor, with the purpose of analysing how well items reflect a single underlying 
performance dimension.  
All items except for B4, B11, and B12 (>.3) have loadings greater than .50 on the 
single factor, while the rest have marginally lower loadings. In the residual correlation 
matrix 53% of the residual correlations are large suggesting that the single factor 
solution still manages to adequately explain the observed correlation matrix. This 
evidence shows that items B1, B2, B3, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9, and B10 satisfactorily 
reflect a single second-order underlying factor. Items B4, B11 and B12 have marginally 
lower loading as shown in Table 4.53. Based on the evidence produced by factor 
analysis it was decided to flag these items as a borderline, questionable item for future 
analysis on the Safety Behaviour Questionnaire but to retain it in subscale B for the 
current analysis. 
 
Variables of the Theory of Planned Behaviour Model 
Subjective Norm, Normative Beliefs, Perceived Behavioural Control, Control Beliefs, 
Behavioural Intention, Valence Beliefs, and Actual Behavioural Control were all 
assessed using two items each in the safety behaviour questionnaire. The use of 
exploratory factor analysis in this instance would therefore not be appropriate as the 
two items are already highly correlated. Exploratory factor analysis was therefore not 
done for the items that make up these variables, and all items used to assess these 
variables were kept for the purposes of this study. 
 
4.5. Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
When the fit of the structural model is analysed consideration has to be given to 
whether variables used to operationalize the latent variables provide an accurate 
representation of the latent variables they were designed to reflect. To do this, the 
indicator variables were analysed by testing the fit of the measurement model before 
fitting the structural model using LISREL.  
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By analysing the covariance matrix produced by LISREL the measurement model will 
be fitted. Maximum likelihood estimation will be used if the multivariate normality 
assumption is satisfied before or after normalisation. Maximum likelihood estimation 
operates under the assumption that the indicator variables used to operationalize the 
latent variables follow a multivariate normal distribution. In the case that normalization 
fails to achieve multivariate normality in the observed data robust maximum likelihood 
estimation is used. 
Confirmatory factor analysis is concerned with the accuracy with which indicator 
variables represent latent variables in the structural model. As such, where the 
measurement model provides a perfectly accurate representation of the process that 
created the observed inter-item covariance matrix the measurement model would 
translate to an exact fit null hypothesis: 
 
Ho28: RMSEA = 0 
Ha28: RMSEA > 0 
 
Following from this the measurement model would translate to a close fit null 
hypothesis where an approximate representation of the process that created the 
observed inter-item covariance matrix is seen: 
 
Ho29: RMSEA ≤ 0.5 
Ha29: RMSEA > 0.5 
 
The overarching substantive research hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is that the Safety 
Behaviour structural model provides a realistic account of the psychological processes 
that underpin Safety Behaviour. This overarching substantive research hypothesis can 
be divided into 12 more detailed substantive research hypotheses as follows: 
 
• Hypothesis 2: Control beliefs (ξ4) has an effect on perceived behavioural control 
(η2). 




• Hypothesis 4: Actual behavioural control (ξ7) has an effect on perceived 
behavioural control (η2). 
• Hypothesis 5: Normative beliefs (ξ5) has an effect on subjective norms (η3). 
• Hypothesis 6: Subjective norms (η3) has an effect on behavioural intention (η5). 
• Hypothesis 7: Valence beliefs (ξ6) has an effect on attitude towards safety 
behaviour (η4). 
• Hypothesis 8: Attitude towards safety behaviour (η4) has an effect on 
behavioural intention (η5). 
• Hypothesis 9: Fatigue (ξ1) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
• Hypothesis 10: Stress (ξ2) has an effect on individual situational awareness 
(η1). 
• Hypothesis 11: Mindfulness (ξ3) has an effect on individual situational 
awareness (η1). 
• Hypothesis 12: Individual situational awareness (η1) has an effect on 
behavioural intention (η5). 
• Hypothesis 13: Behavioural intention (η5) has an effect on behaviour (η6). 
 
The overarching substantive research hypothesis states that the structural model 
provides an accurate and valid account of the psychological processes that drive 
safety behaviour. If the overarching substantive research hypothesis is interpreted to 
mean that the structural model provides an exact explanation for the psychological 
dynamics underlying safety behaviour, the substantive research hypothesis translates 
into the following exact fit null hypothesis:  
 
H01a: RMSEA = 0  
Ha1a: RMSEA > 0 
 
The probability of achieving perfect fit is next to nothing, as such the close fit null 
hypothesis should be taken into account as it takes into account the error of 
approximation.  If the overarching substantive research hypothesis is interpreted to 
mean that the structural model provides an approximate explanation of the 
psychological dynamics underlying employee engagement, the substantive research 




H01b: RMSEA ≤ 0.05  
Ha1b: RMSEA > 0.05 
 
Should the test for reasonable fit be successful, the following path coefficient 











































Should the measurement model successfully reproduce the observed covariance 
matrix, and the measurement model shows that the large majority of variance in 
indicator variables can be accounted for in terms of the latent variables they load onto, 
the operationalization is successful.  
 
Due to the small sample size of 217, three separate CFA models had to be fitted. None 
of the CFA models fitted returned acceptable goodness of fit statistics, so for the 
purposes of this study it was reluctantly decided not to include these results, and 
subsequently move on to Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) using Smart PLS 
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making the assumption that the measurement instruments used are valid. This is 
permissible as the extensive literature review backs up this assumption. 
 
4.6. Fitting the Comprehensive Structural Model Using PLS-SEM 
This section reports on the measurement and structural model Partial Least Squares (PLS) 
results. The previous section discussed the validation results of the measurement instruments 
utilised in this study. Structural model results are used to discuss the hypotheses that the 
study sought to validate. 
 
PLS Results: Validating the Outer (Measurement) Model 
4.6.1. Alpha Coefficient, Composite Reliability, and AVE Values 
 
The alpha coefficients, composite reliability and AVE results of the measurement instruments 
used in this study are shown below. From The results show that all of the measurement 
instruments displayed acceptable internal consistency (i.e. acceptable alpha scores, as well 
as composite reliability scores), and convergent validity (i.e. acceptable AVE values exceeding 
0.50). The exception to the above is Mindfulness, Stress, and Fatigue, which all showed 




Composite Reliability and AVE 





Stress 0.86 0.85 0.39 
Mindfulness 0.82 0.80 0.30 
Fatigue 0.71 0.71 0.24 
Attitude Towards Safety Behaviour 0.89 0.91 0.84 
Subjective Norm 0.90 0.91 0.84 
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Normative Beliefs 0.88 0.88 0.79 
Perceived Behavioural Control 0.95 0.96 0.92 
Control Beliefs 0.93 0.93 0.86 
Behavioural Intention 0.94 0.94 0.88 
Actual Behavioural Control 0.89 0.89 0.81 
Valence Beliefs 0.80 0.81 0.69 
Individual Situational Awareness 0.87 0.88 0.59 






4.6.2. Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity confirms that hypothesised structural paths do exist. The 
Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT) is calculated in this instance to assess discriminant 
validity. This method has been selected as it assesses discriminant validity on the 
basis that it more reliably detects the lack thereof in comparison to other methods 
(Voorhees et al., 2016). It does this by within-scale item correlations and comparing it 
to another scale’s cross correlations. In order for discriminant validity to be achieved 
the cross-correlations should be lower than the within-scale correlations. The results 
showed that discriminant validity was achieved for all the measurement instruments.  
 
A tabular representation of discriminant validity can be found in Appendix D: Results 




4.6.3. Evaluating the Outer Loadings 
To calculate the outer loadings of the model a complete item level model was fitted. 
PLS bootstrap analysis was used to determine if item or subscale loadings of the outer 
model were statistically significant. This translates to analysis on a 95% confidence 
interval. The factor loadings would be classified as being statistically insignificant if 
zero fell within this interval. However, the factor loadings would be considered 
statistically significant if zero were to not fall within the interval.  
These results show that all subscales loaded significantly on the latent constructs they 
intend to measure. The only exception to this was item MND6 which did not load 
significantly on the Mindfulness (MND) construct. It was decided however, not to flag 
item MND6 as a poor item as the effect of one poor item on the model at this stage 
could be argued to be negligible.  
 
4.6.4. Validating the Inner (Structural) Model 
The R² values of the endogenous variables in the model are shown in the table below. 
Values range from 0 (Attitude towards safety behaviour) to 0.30 (Safety Behaviour). 
The results were somewhat surprising in that items such as Attitude towards safety 
behaviour (A) and Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) returned very low values of 0 
and 0.02 respectively. The fact that Safety Behaviour (B), Behavioural Intention (BI), 
Situational Awareness (SA) returned high values of 0.3, 0.2, and 0.12 respectively is 
encouraging. This means that the account for 30%, 20%, and 12% of reported 
variance in the model respectively. 
The Hypothesised paths were tested via PLS analysis, and the results thereof can be 
seen in the table 4.13 below.  
 
Table 4.13 












A BI 0.19 0.06 0,34 yes 0.01 
ABC PBC 0.14 0.03 0,27 yes 0.02 
BI B 0.55 0.43 0,66 yes 0.00 
CB PBC 0.07 -0.07 0,22 no 0.34 
FAT SA 0.01 -0.27 0,29 no 0.97 
MND SA -0.14 -0.34 0,05 no 0.20 
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NB SN 0.22 0.09 0,38 yes 0.00 
PBC BI 0.32 0.19 0,46 yes 0.00 
SA BI -0.1 -0.25 0,06 no 0.19 
SN BI 0.07 -0.05 0,19 no 0.23 
STR SA 0.24 0.01 0,48 yes 0.05 
VB A 0.02 -0.13 0,16 no 0.82 
 
Of the 12 hypothesised paths, 6 were statistically significant, these paths are shown 
in red in the figure 4.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2 




















Note. Statistically significant pathways are shown in red, while statistically insignificant pathways are 












































4.7.5. Interpreting the results of the tested hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1: Control beliefs (ξ4) has an effect on perceived behavioural control (η2). 
The results showed that hypothesis 1 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Control Beliefs (CB) about safety behaviour effects Perceived Behavioural Control 
(PBC). 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived behavioural control (η2) has an effect on behavioural intention 
(η5). 
The results showed that hypothesis 2 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.32. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) has a positive effect 
on Behavioural Intention (BI). 
Hypothesis 3: Actual behavioural control (ξ7) has an effect on perceived behavioural 
control (η2). 
The results showed that hypothesis 3 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.14. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Actual Behavioural Control (ABC) has a positive effect on 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC). 
Hypothesis 4: Normative beliefs (ξ5) has an effect on subjective norms (η3). 
The results showed that hypothesis 4 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.22. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Normative Beliefs (NB) has a positive effect on Subjective 
Norm (SN). 
Hypothesis 5: Subjective norms (η3) has an effect on behavioural intention (η5). 
The results showed that hypothesis 5 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Subjective Norms (SN) effects Behavioural Intention (BI). 
Hypothesis 6: Valence beliefs (ξ6) has an effect on attitude towards safety behaviour 
(η4). 
The results showed that hypothesis 6 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Valence Beliefs (VB) effects Attitude towards Safety Behaviour (A). 
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Hypothesis 7: Attitude towards safety behaviour (η4) has an effect on behavioural 
intention (η5). 
The results showed that hypothesis 7 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.19. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Attitude towards safety behaviour (A) has a positive effect 
on Behavioural Intention (BI). 
Hypothesis 8: Fatigue (ξ1) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
The results showed that hypothesis 8 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Fatigue (FAT) effects Individual Situational Awareness (SA). 
Hypothesis 9: Stress (ξ2) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
The results showed that hypothesis 9 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.24. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Stress (STR) has an effect on Individual Situational 
Awareness (SA). 
Hypothesis 10: Mindfulness (ξ3) has an effect on individual situational awareness (η1). 
The results showed that hypothesis 10 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Mindfulness (MND) effects Individual Situational Awareness (SA). 
Hypothesis 11: Individual situational awareness (η1) has an effect on behavioural 
intention (η5). 
The results showed that hypothesis 11 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Individual Situational Awareness (SA) effects Behavioural Intention (BI). 
Hypothesis 12: Behavioural intention (η5) has an effect on behaviour (η6). 
The results showed that hypothesis 12 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.55. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 







4.7. CONCLUSION  
 
The aim of this chapter was to present and discuss the research results. Firstly, item 
analysis exploratory factor analysis, dimensionality analysis, and confirmatory factor 
analysis was discussed. Following this, validation of the outer model encompassed a 
discussion regarding alpha coefficients, composite reliabilities and AVE values of the 
variables contained in the structural model.  Furthermore, the discriminant validity and 
outer-loadings of the scales were interpreted. Thereafter, the results of the proposed 
hypotheses contained within the structural model, were discussed. The following 
chapter will focus on the interpretation of the research results, identify the limitations 
of this research study, provide recommendations for future research, and discuss the 
practical implications of this research.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This study explored a vast amount of literature and a structural model of the 
antecedents to safety behaviour was derived. It was decided that for the purposes of 
this study the full derived model could not practically be tested, and so an abridged 
safety behaviour structural model was formed. This abridged model looked at the 12 
hypothesised paths that were deemed to be of interest for this study. 
Various measurement instruments that were available in the public domain were 
explored. These instruments were then altered in such a way that the variables in 
question could be measured. The result of this was the Safety Behaviour 
Questionnaire which consisted of 6 sections and 68 items.  
A number of construction organisations were approached to take part in the study, but 
due to a number of constraints it was decided that the best course of action for data 
collection would be to approach the foremen of construction sites in and around the 
Cape Town area to ask for permission for workers to take part in the study. A number 
of lucky draw prizes was used as incentive for workers to take part. Participants 
completed the questionnaires using a pen and paper format. Upon completion of data 
collection a usable sample size of 217 participants was achieved.  
The data was then captured electronically and analysed using a combination of SPSS, 
LISREL, and PLS-SEM techniques. The results were analysed in Chapter 4. During 
assessment of the results problematic items were flagged and removed from the 
questionnaire. It was also concluded the CFA models could not be fitted successfully, 
and regrettably this part of the analysis could not be completed. Using the PLS-SEM 
technique it was shown that 6 of the 12 hypothesised pathways were statistically 
significant. This study was however too small to conclusively say that the remaining 6 
hypotheses can be discounted as there is a multitude of research to back these 
arguments up. It is therefore recommended that further research be initiated to 
investigate these hypotheses. 
Improved understanding of safety behaviour is of critical importance in the high-risk 
industries in South Africa where accidents, injuries, and workplace deaths occur on a 
regular basis, and a complete understanding of the complex phenomenon will lead to 
a basis from which to develop instruments to identify those individuals which are 
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predicted to behave in a way conducive to safety performance and employ them rather 
than those who act in ways that lead to workplace accidents. An understanding of 
safety behaviour also acts as a base from which to develop interventions for those 
already in the workplace, to not only equip them, but also change their understanding, 
and attitudes and beliefs toward safety behaviour, with the aim of decreasing 
workplace accidents. The advantages of decreasing workplace accidents speak for 
themselves and include lower financial costs to organisations, and maybe more 
importantly less physical harm and loss of life to employees. 
The remainder of this chapter will aim to discuss the results presented in Chapter 4, 
draw main conclusions of the study from the discussions, make recommendations for 
future research, discuss the limitations of the study, and lastly discuss the managerial 
implications of this research. 
 
5.2. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results will be discussed under two sections, firstly those pathways in the safety 




5.2.1. Perceived behavioural control has an effect on behavioural intention. 
The results showed that hypothesis 2 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.32. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) has a positive effect 
on Behavioural Intention (BI). 
 
As expected, the results show that this hypotheses proved to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested, and as such perceived behavioural control 
can be used to predict some level of behavioural intention, and ultimately safety 
behaviour.  
 
5.2.2. Actual behavioural control has an effect on perceived behavioural control. 
The results showed that hypothesis 3 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.14. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
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support the hypothesis that Actual Behavioural Control (ABC) has a positive effect on 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC). 
 
Again, as expected the results show that this hypothesis proved to be a good 
representation of the theoretical model that was tested, and as such actual behavioural 
control can be used to predict some level of perceived behavioural control, and 
ultimately safety behaviour. 
 
5.2.3. Normative beliefs have an effect on subjective norms. 
The results showed that hypothesis 4 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.22. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Normative Beliefs (NB) has a positive effect on Subjective 
Norm (SN). 
 
Again, as expected the results show that this hypothesis proved to be a good 
representation of the theoretical model that was tested, and as such normative beliefs 
can be used to predict some level of subjective norm, and ultimately safety behaviour. 
 
5.2.4. Attitude towards safety behaviour has an effect on behavioural intention. 
The results showed that hypothesis 7 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.19. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Attitude towards safety behaviour (A) has a positive effect 
on Behavioural Intention (BI). 
 
As expected the results show that this hypothesis proved to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested, and as such attitude towards safety behaviour 
can be used to predict some level of behavioural intention, and ultimately safety 
behaviour. 
 
5.2.5. Stress has an effect on individual situational awareness. 
The results showed that hypothesis 9 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.24. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 





As expected the results show that this hypothesis proved to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested, and as such stress can be used to predict 
some level of situational awareness, and ultimately safety behaviour. 
 
5.2.6. Behavioural intention has an effect on behaviour. 
The results showed that hypothesis 12 achieved a statistically significant path 
coefficient of 0.55. It can therefore be concluded that this study did yield evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Behavioural Intention (BI) has an effect on Safety 
Behaviour (B). 
 
As expected the results show that this hypothesis proved to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested, and as such behavioural intention can be 
used to predict some level of safety behaviour. 
 
Insignificant Pathways 
5.2.7. Control beliefs has an effect on perceived behavioural control. 
The results showed that hypothesis 1 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Control Beliefs (CB) about safety behaviour effects Perceived Behavioural Control 
(PBC). 
 
Contrary to the expectation, this hypothesis did not prove to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested based on the results of this study. As such, 
based on these results, control beliefs cannot be used as a predictor of perceived 
behavioural control, and ultimately safety behaviour. This hypothesis however forms 
part of Azjen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour (2006), for which there is much 








5.2.8.Subjective norms has an effect on behavioural intention. 
The results showed that hypothesis 5 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Subjective Norms (SN) effects Behavioural Intention (BI). 
 
Contrary to the expectation, this hypothesis did not prove to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested based on the results of this study. As such, 
based on these results, subjective norms cannot be used as a predictor of behavioural 
intention, and ultimately safety behaviour. This hypothesis however forms part of 
Azjen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour (2006), for which there is much supporting 
research. Therefore, this pathway needs to be explored in more depth in future 
research. 
 
5.2.9. Valence beliefs has an effect on attitude towards safety behaviour. 
The results showed that hypothesis 6 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Valence Beliefs (VB) effects Attitude towards Safety Behaviour (A). 
 
Contrary to the expectation, this hypothesis did not prove to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested based on the results of this study. As such, 
based on these results, beliefs of valence of safety behaviour cannot be used as a 
predictor of attitude towards safety behaviour, and ultimately safety behaviour. This 
hypothesis however forms part of Azjen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour (2006), for 
which there is much supporting research. Therefore, this pathway needs to be 
explored in more depth in future research. 
 
5.2.10. Fatigue has an effect on individual situational awareness. 
The results showed that hypothesis 8 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Fatigue (FAT) effects Individual Situational Awareness (SA). 
 
Contrary to the expectation, this hypothesis did not prove to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested based on the results of this study. As such, 
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based on these results, fatigue cannot be used as a predictor of individual situational 
awareness, and ultimately safety behaviour. 
 
5.2.11. Mindfulness has an effect on individual situational awareness. 
The results showed that hypothesis 10 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Mindfulness (MND) effects Individual Situational Awareness (SA). 
 
Contrary to the expectation, this hypothesis did not prove to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested based on the results of this study. As such, 
based on these results, mindfulness cannot be used as a predictor of individual 
situational awareness, and ultimately safety behaviour. 
 
5.2.12. Individual situational awareness has an effect on behavioural intention. 
The results showed that hypothesis 11 did not achieve a statistically significant path 
coefficient. This means that this study did not yield evidence to support the argument 
that Individual Situational Awareness (SA) effects Behavioural Intention (BI). 
 
Contrary to the expectation, this hypothesis did not prove to be a good representation 
of the theoretical model that was tested based on the results of this study. As such, 
based on these results, individual situational awareness cannot be used as a predictor 
of behavioural intention, and ultimately safety behaviour. 
 
5.4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study set out to achieve several research objectives as follows. 
Literature Objectives 
-  To review the meaning of safety behaviour. 
- To determine the antecedents and the meaning of the antecedents of safety 
behaviour. 
- To develop a structural model that explains the influence of human factors on safety 





- To investigate the relationship between the antecedents to safety behaviour and 
safety behaviour in the high-risk industries in South Africa, specifically the construction 
industry. 
- To test the safety behaviour structural model.  
 
In terms of reaching the research objectives, this study was successful. The meaning 
of safety behaviour was explored, and a complex network of relationships between 
various antecedents to safety behaviour was explored which yielded in the 
construction of a structural model for human factors and safety behaviour. As far as 
the empirical research objectives, the relationships between the factors that were 
unearthed and safety behaviour was tested in terms of structural equation modelling.  
 
The results showed that of the 12 hypothesized pathways in the abridged model, 6 
proved to be statistically significant. Of the hypotheses that proved to have statistically 
significant pathways 5 were derived based on literature about the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the TPB is a valid theory when 
applied to the decision-making process in terms of safety behaviour. Many of the 
factors within this theory are factors that can be influenced through training and 
development of employees and thus gives organisations a firm set of variables to aim 
for when aiming to impact on safety behaviour within the organization.  
 
The theoretical model that was put forth from the research study included 6 causal 
pathways from the Theory of Planned behaviour. These pathways have been tested 
empirically in a number of studies and is widely supported in research. However, the 
results of this study showed that 3 of the 6 pathways were not supported in this case. 
This can be attributed to several factors such as deficient theorising. The researcher 
however in this study attributes the lack of support for these pathways to the small 
sample size of 217 construction workers that completed the safety behaviour 
questionnaire. A small sample size poses a number of challenges when it comes to 
data analysis. In this case the question must be asked if the sample that responded to 
the questionnaire portrayed an accurate representation of the larger population of 
construction workers in South Africa?  
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Each of the variables within the Theory of Planned Behaviour model was assessed 
using two items each in the safety behaviour questionnaire. Consideration must 
therefore be given to whether two items is sufficient to accurately measure these 
variables.  
 
The implications thereof is that because the results of this study is in conflict with other 
studies, that when future research is done a considerably larger sample size must be 
used, and the development of items used to measure the variables in question must 
be scrutinized more closely 
 
Most surprisingly the results showed that Mindfulness did not show to be a valid 
indicator of situational awareness although the literature (Zhang and Whu, 2014) 
supports this hypothesis. The conclusion that can be drawn from this result is simply 
that this hypothesis must be explored more thoroughly in future research as a single 
study such as this in a relatively small sample population certainly cannot discredit the 
body of literature and research that has been done in this regard as no apparent flaws 
can be detected in the formulation of the hypothesis.  
 
5.5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has identified a complex safety behaviour structural model, but due to 
practical reasons the model could not be tested in its entirety from the outset. It is 
therefore recommended that future research focus on testing the complete model in 
an effort to find empirical data to support the hypothesised pathways. It is 
recommended that focus be placed on the moderating effects of personality on many 
of the hypothesised pathways, as well as the effect of safety training, culture, and 
climate on the individual’s intention to behave safely as these represent factors which 
are to some extent present in many organisations in the high-risk industries already.  
Due to the previous government and past unfair social and labour practices enforced 
by the apartheid regime it is found that the floor level employees in the high risk 
industries are constituted mainly of those that have been subject to unfair 
discrimination and as a result are to a large degree from what has been identified as 
labour sending areas (LSAs) (Cronje, Reyneke, & van Wyk, 2013). The social 
conditions of these residential areas have certain psychological effects on the 
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employee with regards to the beliefs and attitude towards safety behaviour. Beliefs of 
fatalism have been identified as a major factor(Cronje, Reyneke, & van Wyk, 2013), 
but it is certainly not the only factor that influences beliefs and attitudes towards safety 
behaviour (Havold et al., 2011). It is therefore recommended that future studies focus 
on expanding the safety behaviour structural model in such a way as to include more 
of the factors that arise as a result of LSAs. 
 
Lastly, it is recommended that research be done with regard to the effect of safety 
behaviour on safety outcomes, as well as the other antecedents to safety outcomes 
within an organisation. The purpose of studying safety behaviour is at the end of the 
day to determine the role it plays in safety outcomes so that they can be improved in 
some way. If the effect of safety behaviour is not known as well as what the other 
factors are that determine safety outcomes the research is of no practical use to 
organisations and society. 
 
The safety behavioural structural model must continually be expanded in meaningful 
ways driven by literature and studies that have been done in an effort to explain the 
complex nature of safety behaviour in a manner that accurately represents reality. 
Only once the complex nature of the phenomenon has been acknowledged and 
understood can goal directed and meaningful interventions and instrument be 
produced that add value to organisations within the high-risk industries. 
 
5.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Due to the use of non-probability convenience sampling, sampling error cannot be 
calculated (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 2008). At the outset of this study the aim 
was to target respondents in a number of high risk industries in South Africa, but due 
to a number of factors such as time, permission, and operational requirements of the 
companies approached this was not possible. As a result the sample consisted of 217 
construction workers in the Western Cape winelands region. This in turns means that 
the results of this study should be viewed with that in mind as the results cannot be 
generalized to all workers in all high risk industries in South Africa. 
The manner in which data was collected in this study was also limitation. Sallis and 
Saelens (2000) report that the use of a self-report method as one of the most widely 
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used methods of data collection. The strengths include, amongst other, that self-report 
is useful in collecting a large number of information at a relatively low cost. This was 
a major deciding factor in using this data collection method. Regardless of the 
strengths, response bias is described as a limitation when self-report is utilised. This 
is defined as “the tendency to respond to questions in a manner that, although 
systematic, interferes with the validity of the response” (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007, p. 
228).  
Lastly, sample size was  limitation of this study. At the outset of this the intention was 
to use LISREL to conduct CB SEM, but due to the relatively small sample size of 217 
respondents this was not possible. As a result PLS SEM was used, which resulted in 
meaningful results. Future research however, would benefit from a much larger 
sample size, in more varied companies in high risk industries in South Africa. This 
would provide a more accurate representation of reality than this research. 
 
5.7. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This research study aimed to investigate possible antecedents to safety behaviour in 
an attempt to direct organisations to target interventions at those antecedents that will 
most likely influence safety behaviour in workers in high risk industries in South Africa. 
This would ultimately lead to safer working environments with less safety incidents 
and less loss of life, income, and operational hours. This saves the organisations 
money as well as increasing the quality of working environment for workers which in 
turn positively effects the bottom line of the organisation.  
 
The results of this study provided insights into how organisations can target 
interventions. The results indicated that although not all the hypothesised causal 
pathways proved to be significant, six of the pathways did prove to be significant. This 
section therefore aims to discuss the implications of those pathways that did prove to 
be significant.  
 
At the centre of the safety behaviour structural model was the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Azjen, 2006), which the results of this study corroborated for the most part. 
Much of the interventions that organisations can direct their efforts towards therefore 




Perceived behavioural control refers to the perception an individual has of their ability 
to perform the behaviour of interest, which is determined by the total available set of 
control beliefs and perception of the resources the individual has access to that will 
either allow or impede them to perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). According to 
Ajzen (1991) opinions of referent others or normative beliefs refer to the perceived 
behavioural expectations of such important referent individuals or groups as the 
person's spouse, family, friends, and, depending on the population and behaviour 
studied, teacher, doctor, supervisor, and in this case, co-workers. Attitude toward 
behaviour is the degree to which performance of the behaviour is positively or 
negatively valued (Ajzen, 1991). It also includes the evaluation of the outcomes of 
performing the behaviour of interest. 
 
It is therefore suggested that organisations develop interventions that target the 
above-mentioned factors; namely perceived behavioural control, normative beliefs, 
and attitude towards safety behaviour. Such interventions could include an awareness 
drive that reinforces why safety behaviour is so important. This should include 
highlighting both the positive outcomes of safety behaviour as well as the negative 
consequences of not behaving in safe ways such as accidents, loss of life and limbs, 
operational downtime, loss of personal or organisational income, etc. These 
interventions should focus on changing the opinions of individuals and groups with 
attention given to the perception individuals have on the control they have over certain 
behaviours. This leads to the next point that deals with actual behavioural control. 
 
Actual behavioural control refers to the actual resources and factors that an individual 
has access to that will support them in performing the behaviour. Turning an intention 
into a behaviour is not solely dependent on the strength of the intention, but also on 
the actual behavioural control and individual has (Ajzen, 1991). Organisations should 
therefore ensure that workers have the resources necessary available to them to 
influence their behaviour. This includes making sure workers have access to proper 
personal protective equipment, safety rules and guidelines, as well as any other 
resources that may influence their ability to act in a manner that is safe. This also 
means that organisations must put employees in a position that they have control over 
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their own behaviour, and ensure there are no operational or managerial demands on 
workers that my encourage or require them to behave in manners that are not safe. 
 
5.7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to put forward a possible complex nomological network 
of factors influencing safety behaviour in employees working in high risk industries in 
South Africa as a means to better understand and conceptualise the psychological 
processes underlying safety behaviour. The study provided insights into the 
complexity of safety behaviour and to a few antecedents to that. The insights 
presented in this research study can enable organisations to design and implement 
interventions that will positively influence the saving  safety behaviour, in turn leading 
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APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORM AND LETTER 





















CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Research on Human Factors and Safety Behaviour 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rigardt Griessel MCom (Industrial 
Psychology), from the Department of Industrial Psychology at Stellenbosch University.  The results of 
this research will contribute to the degree MCom (Industrial Psychology). You were selected as a 
possible participant in this study because you are employed by an organisation that operates in an 
industry where accident and incidents are usually high when compared to other industries. 
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the safety behaviours of individuals in certain industries in 
South Africa, and furthermore to determine the factors which influence safety behaviour choices and 
the beliefs that accompany safety behaviour. The goal of the research is to contribute towards an 
understanding of the causes of unsafe behaviour. Understanding is important as it informs interventions 
aimed at improving employees’ behaviour with the goal of decreasing workplace accidents, injuries, 




If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following things: 
• Complete a survey questionnaire. 
 
Completion of questionnaires will take place in a single session which will last roughly 30 minutes. 
 
3. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts which may result from partaking in this study. 
 
4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
There will be no short-term benefits for you for taking part in this study, but the results will further the 
understanding of safety behavior and the factors that influence it. In the long run this can be used to 
develop interventions to improve the safety in organisations such as yours. This could result in a 
decrease in the number of workplace accidents, injuries, and deaths. 
 




There will be an incentive for participation in the form of a lucky draw. The prizes will consist of 4x 
R500 cash prizes. The procedure for the lucky draw will be as follows: 
 
When questionnaires are returned to the researcher/representative collecting questionnaires the 
participant will be asked if they want to be considered for the lucky draw, if so they will be asked to 
provide their contact number which will be recorded once questionnaires have been handed in. This 
will not be connected to any questionnaire in order to protect anonymity. 
The contact numbers will be entered into a lucky draw and 4 winners will be selected at random using 
an Excel formula, and contacted via the telephone number given in order for prizes to be distributed. 
The lucky draw will take place on the 19th of November 2018. Winners of the lucky draw will be 
contacted on or before the 23rd of November 2018, if winners of the prizes cannot be contacted after 




We will not require any personal details from you as the study is completely anonymous. Any 
information that is obtained about this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential 
and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Confidentiality will be maintained 
by means of the safeguarding of all test results or information given to us. Only the researchers involved 




7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may 
withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions 
you don’t want to answer and remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this 
research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.  
 
8. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact: 
 
• Rigardt Griessel:          Researcher (Mcomm Industrial Psychology Student) 
     072 0158 146 
          16061780@sun.ac.za 
 
• Tendai Mariri:              Research Supervisor 
    (021) 808 9440 
          tmariri@sun.ac.za 
 
9.   RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are 
not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  If 
you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact Ms Maléne Fouché 






SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT 
 
The information above was described to me by Rigardt Griessel in [Afrikaans/English] and I am in 
command of this language or it was satisfactorily translated to me. I was given the opportunity to ask 

















20 November 2018 
 
Good day Shaun, 
 
I hope you are well. 
 
As discussed with you telephonically, I am currently completing my master’s degree 
in Industrial Psychology through the University of Stellenbosch. As part of the 
requirement to complete my degree I must do a Thesis which involves a research 
aspect, which I hope to conduct at The Power Group. My Thesis is entitled “Safety 
Behaviour in High Risk Industries”, and focuses on the human factors that drives 
safety behaviour in employees in high risk industries such as the petrochemical, 
mining, and construction industries where accidents and incidents are of a high risk. 
 
With the Power Group being in the construction industry, the company fits the bill 
perfectly as a candidate for me to conduct my research at. In order for me to conduct 
my research and collect the necessary data I would need access to a number of your 
employees that physically work on construction sites as well as any other employees 
that access construction sites as a part of their job. Data collection would entail a 
physical pen and paper questionnaire that would take roughly 30 minutes to complete.  
 
I want to stress that should the Power Group allow me to conduct my research within 
the company, participation in the questionnaire will be completely optional for 
employees in order to adhere to ethical guidelines. In keeping with this, I plan to invite 
the employees via e-mail to partake in the research project (sent via yourself so that I 
do not have to gain access to employee contact details). In the case where employees 
do not have access to e-mail I will explain to them on site the purpose of the study and 
invite them to participate after a time and place has been organised for them to 
convene. I will also provide an incentive of 4 lucky draw cash prizes of R500 each, of 
which all participants will be eligible to win.  
 
I also want to point out that the confidentiality of all individuals taking part in the study 
will be protected. At no point will I collect any personal or identifying information of any 
individuals, and the data collected will only be used on an aggregated level. The 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 118 
confidentiality of The Power Group will also be protected, at no point in my thesis will 
I publish the name of the company. The results of my data collection will however be 
reported on in my master’s thesis, which could possibly be published in an academic 
journal. 
 
Please find attached for your perusal my research proposal which explains the 
purpose and aim of the study, as well as the questionnaire that will be administered to 
participants.  
 
With your permission I would like to commence with the data collection process on the 
21st of November 2018. 
 
If you have any questions regarding the above please feel free to contact me via e-
mail or on 072 0158 146. 
 







































Section 1: The Perceived Stress Scale 
 
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last month. 
In each case, you will be asked to indicate by circling how often you felt or thought a certain 
way.  
 
0 = Never; 1 = Almost Never; 2 = Sometimes; 3 Fairly Often; 4 = Very Often 
 
1. In the last month, how often have you been upset because of 




0 1 2 3 4 
    
  
 
2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable 




0 1 2 3 4 
 




0 1 2 3 4 
 
4. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your 




0 1 2 3 4 
 
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that things were 
going your way?  
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
6. In the last month, how often have you found that you could not 




0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. In the last month, how often have you been able to control 





0 1 2 3 4 
 
8. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top 
of things?  
 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
9. In the last month, how often have you been angered because of 




0 1 2 3 4 
 
10. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties were 





0 1 2 3 4 
 
Section 2: The Mindfulness Awareness Scale 
 
Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using the 
1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each 
experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than 
what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from every 
another item. 
 
1 = Almost Always; 2 = Very Frequently; 3 = Somewhat Frequently; 4 = Somewhat 
Infrequently; 5 = Very Infrequently; 6 = Almost Never 
 
1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime 
later.   
        
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                      
2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of 
something else.    
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                      
3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present.      
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying attention to what I 
experience along the way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they grab my 
attention. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first time.      
   
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                                                      
7. It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness of what I’m doing.       
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                                                    
8. I rush through activities without being attentive to them.     
    
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                        
9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I’m doing 
right now to get there.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                  
 
10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm doing.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                                                                        
11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the same 
time.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                                    
12. I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder why I went there.    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                                                                                             




1 2 3 4 5 6 
                             
14. I find myself doing things without paying attention.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
                                     
 
Section 3: The Fatigue Questionnaire 
 
We would like to know more about any problems you have had with feeling tired, weak or lacking in 
energy in the last month. Please answer ALL the questions by ticking the answer which applies to 
you most closely. If you have been feeling tired for a long while, then compare yourself to how you 
felt when you were last well. 
 
0 = Less than usual; 1 = no more than usual; 2 = more than usual; 3 = much more than usual 
 
1. Do you have problems with tiredness?  
 
 
2. Do you need more rest?             
                     
         
3. Do you feel sleepy or drowsy?          
                         
 
4. Do you have problems starting things?     
                  
 
5. Do you lack energy?        
                                         
 
6. Do you have strength in your muscles?  
 
 
7. Do you feel weak?       
                                            
 
8. Do you have difficulties concentrating? 
 
 
9. Do you make slips of the tongue when speaking?      
 
 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 
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10. Do you find it more difficult to find the right words?   
 
 
Section 4: Planned Behaviour 
 
We would like to know more about your safety behavior at work. Please answer each of the 
questions by selecting the option that is the most applicable to you. Please treat each question on its 
own. 
 
1. Me adhering to safety guidelines and rules while on site would be 
 
                              bad good 
 
2. Me adhering to safety guidelines and rules while on site would lead to less accidents 
happening 
                               
                       disagree agree 
 
 
3. Most of my co-workers approve of me adhering to safety guidelines and rules while on site 
  
                       agree disagree 
 
4. My co-workers believe that following safety guidelines and rules help reduce accident. 
 
                       disagree agree 
 
5. Most of my co-workers adhere to safety guidelines and rules while on site 
  
                       agree disagree 
 
6. It is expected of me that I follow safety guidelines and rules while on site 
 
                       disagree agree 
 
7. I am confident that I am able to follow all safety guidelines and rules while on site 
                 
                              true false 
 
8. It is mostly up to me whether I follow safety guidelines and rules when on site. 
 
                       disagree agree 
 
0 1 2 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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9. My following all safety guidelines is dependent on the influence of people other 
than myself. 
 
                       disagree agree 
 
10. Me following all safety guidelines and rules is  
                     
                   impossible possible 
 
11. I intend to follow all safety guidelines and rules while on site 
                            
                            likely unlikely 
 
12. I plan to follow all safety guidelines and rules in the future 
                            
                       disagree agree 
 
13. In the past I have adhered to safety guidelines and rules 
                                       
                            false  true 
 
 
14. I have been able to follow safety guidelines and rules in the past 
                               
                       disagree agree 
 
15. It is important for me to follow safety guidelines and rules 
                               
                       disagree agree 
 
16. Me following safety guidelines and rules does not matter 
                               
                          agree disagree 
 
 
Section 5: Situational Awareness 
 
We would like to know more about your situational awareness at work. Please answer each of the 
questions by selecting the option that is the most applicable to you, answers vary on a scale from 1 
to 7. Please treat each question on its own.  
 
1. Is your daily work situation unstable and like to change often, or is it very stable and 
straightforward? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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                       stable unstable 
 
2. How complicated is your work, is it complex with many interrelated tasks, or is it simple 
and straightforward? 
                             
                       simple complicated 
 
3. Are there many variables changing within your work situation, or do variables largely stay 
the same? 
                    
           low variability          high variability 
 
4. Are you usually highly alert in your daily work situation, or are you less alert? 
            
                       less alert highly alert 
 
5. When performing your daily tasks, are you concentrating on many factors at once 
(high) or only on one factor at a time (low)? 
                                             
                                low high 
 
6. Do you have sufficient capacity to attend to many variables (high), or nothing extra 
to spare at all (low) 
 





Section 6: Safety Behaviour 
 
We would like to know more about your safety behaviour in at work. Please answer all 
questions by selecting the answer that applies most accurately to you. Please treat each 
question its own. 
 
 
1. When the company offers safety training or structured safety programs that are voluntary 
I will go if I am able to. 
    
                            never always 
 
2. When I am at structured safety training or programs I pay attention to the content of the 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




                             
                            never always 
 
3. When I am at structured safety training or programs I try to be actively involved in the 
program. 
 
                       disagree agree 
 
4. I see the value in structured safety training programs, they will help me to do my work 
safely and will reduce accidents. 
                                 
                       disagree agree 
 
5. I try to identify risks in the work place in order to minimize accidents that may take 
place.  
                                 
                       disagree agree 
 
 
6. I listen to instruction regarding my safety and the safety of my colleagues from 
management or supervisors while on site. 
 
                       disagree agree 
 
7. I try to help my colleagues and co-workers do their jobs in a safe manner. 
                                           
                       disagree agree 
 
8. I regularly discuss safety issues with my co-workers or supervisor. 
                                             
                            never always 
 
9. I use all prescribed safety gear an equipment provided for me. 
                                          
                            never always 
 
10.  I follow all safety procedures and guidelines as set out by the company. 
                                     
                            never always 
 
11.  I will never take risks to complete my work faster or because it may be easier. 
                                                        
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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                       disagree agree 
 
12. I only follow safety guidelines and rules because I am being supervised and will get 
in trouble if I do not. 
                                        
                          agree disagree 
 
 
               --------------------------------------------     END    ----------------------------------------------------- 
 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix D attached a separate PDF document. 
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